Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1989

Shirley Gillmor v. Dennis K. Wright, Sara C.
Wright, David L. Wright, Rona R. Wright : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Richard C. Skeen, R. Stephen Marshall; Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy; D. Gilbert Athay;
attorneys for respondents.
James B. Lee, John B. Wilson; Parsons, Behle & Latimer; attorneys for appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Shirley Gillmor v. Dennis K. Wright, Sara C. Wright, David L. Wright, Rona R. Wright, No. 890257.00 (Utah Supreme
Court, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/2624

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

nz*- j

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

SHIRLEY GILLMOR, as Personal
Representative of the Estate
of Stephen T. Gillmor,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No. 890257
vs.
DENNIS K. WRIGHT, SARA C.
WRIGHT, DAVID L. WRIGHT,
RONA R. WRIGHT,

Priority No. 16

Defendants-Respondents/
Cross-Appellants,
and
CHARLES F. GILLMOR,
EDWARD LESLIE GILLMOR,
Intervenor-DefendantsRespondents/Cross-Appellants,
BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLANT EDWARD LESLIE GILLMOR
On Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court of Summit County
Honorable Michael R. Murphy, District Judge
JAMES B. LEE (1919)
JOHN B. WILSON (3511)
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Appellant
Shirley Gillmor
185 South State St., Ste. 700
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
D. GILBERT ATHAY
of and for
ATHAY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Cross-Appellants
Wrights, Charles F. Gillmor
72 East 400 South
Suite 325
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

RICHARD C. SKEEN (2971)
R. STEPHEN MARSHALL (2097)
of and for
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL
& MCCARTHY
Attorneys for Cross-Appellant
Edward Leslie Gillmor
50 So. Main St., Ste. 1600
P.O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone: (801) 532-3333

FILED
SEP 1 7 1990
Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SHIRLEY GILLMOR, as Personal
Representative of the Estate
of Stephen T. Gillmor,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
DENNIS K. WRIGHT, SARA C.
WRIGHT, DAVID L. WRIGHT,
RONA R. WRIGHT,

Case No. 890257
Priority No. 16

De f endant s-Respondents/
Cross-Appellants,
and
CHARLES F. GILLMOR,
EDWARD LESLIE GILLMOR,
Intervenor-DefendantsRespondents/Cross-Appellants,
BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLANT EDWARD LESLIE GILLMOR
On Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court of Summit County
Honorable Michael R. Murphy, District Judge
JAMES B. LEE (1919)
JOHN B. WILSON (3511)
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Appellant
Shirley Gillmor
185 South State St., Ste. 700
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
D. GILBERT ATHAY
of and for
ATHAY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Cross-Appellants
Wrights, Charles F. Gillmor
72 East 400 South
Suite 325
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

RICHARD C. SKEEN (2971)
R. STEPHEN MARSHALL (2097)
of and for
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL
"& MCCARTHY
Attorneys for Cross-Appellant
Edward Leslie Gillmor
50 So. Main St., Ste. 1600
P.O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone: (801) 532-3333

TABLE OF CONTENTS
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

1

DETERMINATIVE LEGISLATION

4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

4

A.

Nature of the Case

4

B.

Disposition of the Case Below

4

C.

Statement of Facts

5

1.

Introduction

5

2.

The Sawmill Property

5

3.

The Access Awarded Under the Partition
Decree

7

4.

The Sawmill Canyon Road

8

5.

The Sawmill Canyon Road Provides the
Only Access to tfie Eastern Portions of
the Property Awarded to Edward L»
Gillmor and Charles F. Gillmor for
Grazing Purposes

10

The Error in the Description of the
Easement in the Partition Decree

13

Inconsistencies Between the Descriptions
in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law and the Partition Decree

18

Richard Huffman's Mistake in Describing
the Road

19

Discovery of the Mistake in the
Description of the Sawmill Canyon Road
in the Partition Decree

22

6.
7.

8.
9.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
ARGUMENT

23
24

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT EDWARD L.
GILLMOR WAS NOT ENTITLED
TO AN EASEMENT BY
IMPLICATION OVER THE
ENTIRETY OF THE SAWMILL
CANYON ROAD
A.

24

The Evidence and the Court's
Findings Establish All of the
Elements for Implication of an
Easement Over the Entirety of
the Sawmill Canyon Road

24

The Lower Court Erred in
Holding that Implication of an
Easement is Barred bv Notions
of Finality Inherent in the
Doctrines of Res Judicata and
Collateral Estoppel

29

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
EDWARD L. GILLMOR IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN
EASEMENT BY NECESSITY OVER THE ENTIRETY
OF THE SAWMILL CANYON ROAD

33

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
EDWARD L. GILLMOR WAS NOT ENTITLED TO AN
ORDER REFORMING OR CORRECTING THE
DESCRIPTION OF THE SAWMILL CANYON ROAD
IN THE PARTITION DECREE ON THE GROUNDS
OF MUTUAL MISTAKE

36

B.

A.

B.

The Description of the Sawmill
Canyon Road in the Partition Decree
was a Mutual Mistake and the Court
Should Have Modified the
Description Pursuant to the
Independent Action in Eguitv
Brought bv Edward L. Gillmor and
Charles F. Gillmor

36

The Trial Court's Finding that the
Court in the Partition Action did
not Intend to Provide Edward L.
Gillmor and Charles F. Gillmor
Access over the Property Awarded to
Florence Gillmor was Clearly
Erroneous and Against the Weight of
the Evidence

42

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Adamson v. Brockbank, 112 Utah 52, 185 P.2d
264, 272 (1947)

27

Beck v. Mills. 616 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. Civ. App.
1981)

35

Blonauist v. Frandsen. 694 P.2d 595, 596
(Utah 1984)

42

Carr v. District of Colombia/ 543 F.2d 917,
927 N.83 (1976)

40

Condas v. Condas, 618 P.2d 491, 495-96 (Utah
1980)

42

Cotter v. Moore. 634 S.W.2d 332 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1982)

28

Deisenroth v. Dodge. 7 111. 2d 340, 131
N.E.2d 17 (1956)

29

Doelle v. Bradley. 784 P.2d 1176, 1179 (Utah
1989)

2, 3

Eaan v. Eaan. 560 P.2d 704 (Utah 1977)

37

Hewitt v. Meanev. 181 Cal. App. 3d 367, 226
Cal. Rptr. 349 (1986)
Locklin v. Switzer Brothers, Inc., 335 F.2d
331, 334 (7th Cir. 1964), cert, denied, 379
U.S. 962 (1965)
7
Madsen v. Borthick. 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988)

34
40
...

30

Mesmer v. Uharriet. 174 Cal. 110, 162 P. 104
(1916)

29

Morris v. Blunt. 49 Utah 243, 161 P.1127
(1916)

27

Nev v. Harrison. 5 Utah 2d 217, 299 P.2d
1114, 1116 (1956)
Ovard v. Cannon. 600 P.2d 1246 (Utah 1979)
Savage v. Nielsen. 114 Utah 22, 197 P.2d 117
(1948)

37
....

26
33

Stewart v. Sullivan, 29, Utah 2d 156, 506
P.2d 74, 76

37

Swainston v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc..
766 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah 1988)

30

Tschagqenv v. Union Pacific Land Resources,
555 P.2d 277, 280 (Utah 1976)

27, 33

Wagner v. Fairlamb, 151 Colo. 481, 379 P.2d
165 (1963)

34, 35

Watkins v. Simonds, 11 Utah 2d 46, 354 P.2d
852 (1960)

27

West Virginia Oil & Gas Co. v. George E.
Breece Lumber, 213 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1954) . . . .

38

STATUTES, CONSTITUTION
Utah Constitution Art. VIII,
3; Utah Code
Ann.
78-2-2(3)(j) (Repl. Vol. 1987)

1

Rules 3, 24(f), Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure

49

Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

3

Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure . . . . 3, 36
Utah Code Ann.
1987)

78-2-2(3)(j) (Repl. Vol.
1

OTHER AUTHORITIES
Restatement (First) of Real Property
at 2978

476,
27

R. Powell & P. Rowen, Powell on Real Property
410, at 34-72, 73 (rev. perm. ed. 1987) . . . 29, 34
11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice
and Procedure
2868, at 239-40 (1973)

gI\wpl\088\00000d4a.W51

40

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SHIRLEY GILLMOR, as Personal
Representative of the Estate
of Stephen T. Gillmor,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

]
|i
]
]i

DENNIS K. WRIGHT, SARA C.
WRIGHT, DAVID L. WRIGHT,
RONA R. WRIGHT,
Defendants-Respondents/
Cross-Appellants,

Case No. 890257
Priority No. 16

]

and
CHARLES F. GILLMOR,
EDWARD LESLIE GILLMOR,

]

Intervenor-Defendants;
Respondents/Cross-Appellants, ;
BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLANT EDWARD LESLIE GILLMOR
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has appellate jurisdiction under Utah
Constitution Art. VIII,

3; Utah Code Ann.

78-2-2(3)(j) (Repl.

Vol. 1987); and Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court err in holding as a matter of

law that cross-appellant/intervenor-defendant Edward L. Gillmor
(hereinafter "Edward L. Gillmor") was not entitled to an easement
by implication over the Sawmill Canyon Road across property owned
by plaintiff Shirley Gillmor (hereinafter "Shirley Gillmor")?
The trial court refused to award the easement based on
"traditional notions of finality inherent in the doctrines of res

judicata and collateral estoppel."

(R. 885.) Because the court's

holding was a conclusion of law, this Court need accord it no
deference but should review it for correctness.1

Doelle v.

Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 1179 (Utah 1989).
2.

Did the trial court err in holding as a matter of

law that Edward L. Gillmor was not entitled to an easement by
necessity over the Sawmill Canyon Road across property owned by
Shirley Gillmor?

The court held this claim was barred by

"traditional notions of finality inherent in the doctrines of res
judicata and collateral estoppel."

(R. 885.)

The court's

holding was a conclusion of law and this Court need accord it no
deference but should review it for correctness.

Doelle v.

Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 1179 (Utah 1989).
3.

Was trial court's finding that the trial court in

the Partition Action "did not intend to provide Edward Gillmor
and Charles Gillmor access over parcels awarded to Florence
Gillmor" (Finding of Fact No. 28, R. 884) clearly erroneous as
against the weight of the evidence?

This is a question of fact,

the standard of review for which allows reversal if the finding
is clearly erroneous and against the clear weight of the

1

The lower court designated its holding that the Edward L.
Gillmor's claims are barred by "traditional notions of finality" as
a finding of fact. The holding is in reality a conclusion of law
and this Court should not accord it any added deference simply
because it was denominated a finding of fact. State v. Rio Vista
Oil, Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343, 1347 (Utah 1990).
-2G:\WPL\088\00000D4A.W51

evidence.

Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P. 2d 1176, 1178 (Utah 1989);

Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
4.

Did the trial court err in refusing to reform or

correct the description of the Sawmill Canyon Road in the
Partition Decree on the grounds of mutual mistake?
involves mixed questions of fact and law.

This issue

The issue of fact is

whether the trial court in the Partition Action intended to deny
Edward L. Gillmor and Charles F. Gillmor access to their property
across the property awarded to Florence Gillmor, addressed in the
preceding paragraph.

The issue of law is whether the lower

court, sitting as a court in equity, has the power to consider an
independent action in equity brought under Rule 60(b), Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, to reform or modify a legal description
caused by a mutual mistake of fact where the action was brought
several years after the entry of the decree containing the
mistake.

The issue of law should be reviewed for correctness, no

deference being accorded to the trial court's conclusions.
Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 1179 (Utah 1989).
5.

Did the trial court properly hold that Shirley

Gillmor is- not entitled to a private easement of access across
defendants' property for persons who had purchased big game
permits to hunt big game on her property and in holding further
that Shirley Gillmor is not entitled to injunctive relief and
damages?

Because the hunting issue will be addressed by
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defendant Wright and intervenor-defendant Charles F. Gillmor,
this Brief will not specifically consider that issue.

Edward L.

Gillmor joins in any Brief filed by Wright and Charles F. Gillmor
in connection with the hunting issue.
DETERMINATIVE LEGISLATION
There are no Constitutional provisions, statutes,
ordinances, rules, or regulations whose interpretation is
believed to be determinative.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

This is a cross-appeal from the lower court's Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 876-88) and Judgment (R. 88990) dismissing Edward L. Gillmor's Counterclaim.

Shirley Gillmor

commenced this action seeking injunctive relief and damages from
the Wrights.

Charles F. Gillmor and Edward L. Gillmor were

allowed to intervene as defendants and to bring Counterclaims
against Shirley Gillmor seeking an award of an easement over the
Sawmill Canyon Road where it crosses Shirley Gillmor's property.
(R. 656-78.)
B.

Disposition of the Case Below.

Edward L. Gillmor filed a Counterclaim in Intervention,
pursuant to the Stipulation of the parties and order of the court
(R. 765-69.)

The action was tried before the lower court,

sitting without a jury, on September 20-21, 1988. The court
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issued its Summary Decision on November 29, 1988.

(R. 771-86.)

The court entered its Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law
and its Judgment dismissing all claims on May 19, 1989.

(R. 876-

90.)
C.

Statement of Facts.
1.

Introduction.

The Counterclaims of Edward L. Gillmor and Charles F.
Gillmor seek an order reversing the trial court and ordering that
they should be awarded an easement by implication and by
necessity over the Sawmill Canyon Road where it crosses property
owned by Shirley Gillmor.

They also seek an order reforming the

legal description of the road contained in the Judgment and
Decree of Partition entered by the court in a prior action
between the parties, based on an error contained in the
description caused by the mutual mistake of the parties.
2.

The Sawmill Property.

The action tried in the lower court focuses on a parcel
of real property, known as the Sawmill property, located in
Summit County consisting of approximately 5139 acres.

Shirley

Gillmor's predecessor in interest, Florence Gillmor, together
with Edward L. Gillmor and Charles F. Gillmor at one time owned
the entire Sawmill property as tenants in common.

They also

owned numerous other properties located in Salt Lake, Tooele,
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Wasatch, and Summit Counties consisting of approximately 34,000
acres.
In 1974, Edward L. Gillmor and his wife commenced an
action against Florence Gillmor and against Charles F. Gillmor
and his wife, in the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake
County, Civil No, 223998, seeking partition of all of the
approximately 34,000 acres of property jointly owned by the
parties (the "Partition Action").

On February 17, 1981,

following a lengthy trial, the lower court issued a Judgment and
Decree of Partition (the "Partition Decree") which partitioned
the Sawmill property into four separate parcels.2

(Finding of

Fact No. 7, R. 880; Exhibit 33; Trial transcript, Vol. I, at
25. ) 3

The Partition Decree awarded fee ownership for each

parcel of the Sawmill Property as follows:

2

The Partition Action was tried initially in 1977 and
appealed to this Court, as Case No. 15457. In an unpublished
opinion dated March 23, 1979, this Court remanded the case to the
trial court because the case was "only half tried." The trial
court was directed to take additional evidence relating to the
appurtenant rights pertaining to the parcels that had been
partitioned. The Court's opinion of March 23, 1979, was admitted
into evidence at the trial of the present action as Exhibit D-55.
3

The record before the Court includes transcripts of the
hearing on the motion for a temporary restraining order (R. 934)
and the hearing on the motion for a preliminary injunction (R.
936). For purposes of clarification, the trial transcript will be
referred to in this brief by the notation "Tr." References to the
other transcripts will identify the hearing and the date of the
transcript. The trial transcript identified as R. 937 will not be
referred to in this brief.
The two larger transcripts, dated
September 20 and 21, will be referred to as Volumes II and III,
respectively.
-6G:\WPL\088\00000D4A.W51

Parcel No. 1, Charles F. Gillmor.
Parcel No. 2, Edward L. Gillmor.
Parcel No. 3, Florence Gillmor.
Parcel No. 4, Florence Gillmor.
(Finding of Fact Nos. 1-3, 7, R. 880; Exhibit 2, pp. 25-26;
Exhibit 33, pp. 58-60; Tr. Vol. I, at 25. ) 4

The trial court's

decision in the Partition Action was.affirmed by this Court. 657
P.2d 736 (Utah 1982).
The partition of the property was illustrated on the
two maps introduced into evidence, Exhibits 1 and 30. A copy of
a topographical map covering the Sawmill property, identical to
Exhibit 1, showing the division of the property between the
parties is attached hereto as Exhibit A.

The attached map also

shows the Sawmill Canyon Road and other stock roads and trails
used by Edward L. Gillmor prior to the Partition Action.
3.

The Access Awarded Under
the Partition Decree.

After describing the portions of the Sawmill property
awarded to each party, the Partition"Decree provided that "[a]
roadway and stock trail easement is reserved," following which a
metes and bounds description is given.

A

(Exhibit 2, at 25-26.)

The property awarded to Florence Gillmor was subsequently
conveyed over time to Stephen T. Gillmor and/or his wife, Shirley
Gillmor. At the time of trial, the portion of the Sawmill property
awarded to Florence Gillmor was entirely owned by plaintiff Shirley
Gillmor. (Finding of Fact No. 8, R. 880.)
-7G:\WPL\088\00000D4A.W51

The easement, which follows part of the Sawmill Canyon Road, does
not give Edward L. Gillmor or Charles F. Gillmor access by the
road to the eastern portions of their property.

The easement

terminates in the middle of the property awarded to Florence
Gillmor.

At the trial, Edward L. Gillmor, Jr., (the son of

defendant Edward Leslie Gillmor, also known as "Luke") identified
the place where the easement described in the Partition Decree
terminates by making an "X" on Exhibit 30 and writing the word
"Decree" in black ink.

(Tr. Vol. I, at 63.) He testified that

he believed the description of the easement to be in error
because it did not give his father the right of access over the
entirety of the Sawmill Canyon Road to the eastern portions of
the property awarded to him in a way that would allow the
property to be used for grazing.
4.

(Tr. Vol. I, at 63-65.)

The Sawmill Canyon Road.

The Sawmill Canyon Road provides the only reasonable
access from the state highway to the respective parcels owned by
the parties. The Sawmill Canyon Road is a steep road that
follows the bottom of Sawmill Canyon up to a point at the top of
the mountain which is on Shirley Gillmor's property.

Sawmill

Canyon, through which the road runs, is a narrow canyon with
steep walls and cliffs on both sides of the road.
cannot be crossed by vehicles or livestock.

The cliffs

From the mouth of

Sawmill Canyon, the road first traverses the property owned by
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the Wrights and then rises rapidly as it crosses the western
portions of the property of Charles F. Gillmor, Edward L.
Gillmor, and Shirley Gillmor, in that order.512

After passing

onto Shirley Gillmor's property, in a northerly direction, the
Sawmill Canyon Road runs in a northeasterly direction and then
turns to the south running back across the eastern portions of
property owned by Edward L. Gillmor and Frank Gillmor along
Thirtyfive Canyon.

(Finding of Fact No. 5, R. 879-80.)

At the trial, Edward L. Gillmor, Jr., identified the
original Sawmill Canyon Road in red ink on Exhibit 30.

(Tr. Vol.

I, at 26-27.) He further testified that he and his father had
made additional roads with a bulldozer on the Sawmill property
after they purchased it in 1967, which were identified on Exhibit
30 in blue ink.

(Tr. Vol. I, at 27.) The Sawmill Canyon Road,

and other stock trails traditionally used, are shown on the map
attached hereto as Exhibit A in both red and blue ink, as
indicated on Exhibit 30.
Historically, the Sawmill Canyon Road has been used for
many years for the purpose of trailing livestock over the Sawmill
property, for hauling supplies, inspecting the grazing livestock,
and inspecting the property.

The Sawmill Canyon Road provided

Photographs of certain portions of the road were
introduced at the hearing on the preliminary injunction held on
September 25, 1987, as Exhibits P-9 through 21. (Transcript of
preliminary injunction hearing 9-25-87, R. 936, at 46-52.)
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the sole access to the eastern portion of the property.

For many

years the parties regularly used the Sawmill Canyon Road, as did
their predecessors and others to whom the property was leased for
ranching and livestock purposes.

(Tr. Vol. I, at 30-31, 37, 78-

80, 137.)
The trial court made the following finding regarding
the historical use of the Sawmill Canyon Road:
The Gillmor family, for many years prior to
December, 1986, used the Sawmill Canyon Road
to obtain access to their property for
themselves, their employees and their guests
to transport and tend livestock, to perform
maintenance or construct improvements on the
property, and for big game hunting by the
family, employees and guests, but not
including access for persons holding permits
from the landowners to hunt big game. The
road has historically carried a variety of
vehicles including trucks, sheep camps, heavy
equipment and recreational vehicles, and has
been travelled by persons on foot and on
horseback.
(Finding of Fact No. 10, R. 881.)
5.

The Sawmill Canyon Road Provides the Only
Access to the Eastern Portions of the
Property Awarded to Edward L. Gillmor and
Charles F. Gillmor for Grazing Purposes.

Edward L. Gillmor has traditionally used the Sawmill
property for livestock operations, such as grazing cattle and
sheep.

(Tr. Vol. I, at 22, 29.)

Because the Sawmill Canyon is

very steep with mountainous and rugged terrain, the only access
that Edward L. Gillmor and Charles F. Gillmor have to the eastern
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portions of their respective parcels is along the Sawmill Canyon
Road.

The trial court made the following finding:
Edward Gillmor and Charles Gillmor do not
have traditional grazing access to eastern
portions of their Sawmill parcels unless they
are allowed access over parcels awarded to
Florence Gillmor and now owned by Shirley
Gillmor.

(Finding of Fact No. 25, R. 884.)
In spite of this finding, the trial court held that
neither Edward L. Gillmor nor Charles F. Gillmor was entitled to
an easement to use the Sawmill Canyon Road where it crosses
Shirley Gillmor's property to gain access to the eastern portions
of their property.

The trial court's holding was founded on

"traditional notions of finality inherent in the doctrines of res
judicata and collateral estoppel."

(Finding of Fact No. 32, R.

885. )
The Court's finding that the only access that Edward L.
Gillmor and Charles F. Gillmor have to the eastern portions of
their property is over the Sawmill Canyon Road was supported by
ample evidence introduced at trial.
78-80, 137.)

(Tr. Vol. I, at 30-31, 37,

Because Shirley Gillmor claimed at the trial that

Edward L. Gillmor and Charles F. Gillmor had access to the
eastern portions of their property through Pine Canyon or through
Thirtyfive Canyon, the trial court personally examined the
property.

In its Memorandum Decision, the court stated:
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In addition to being presented with
testimonial evidence, the court inspected the
premises, traversed in a four-wheel drive
vehicle the length of Sawmill Canyon Road,
viewed each end of 35 Canyon and walked the
length of Pine Canyon. This evidence
persuaded the court that intervenors do not
have traditional grazing access to the
eastern portions of their own parcels unless
they are allowed access over the parcels
awarded to plaintiff.
35 Canyon is not accessible for grazing
from the south. Consequently, access over
intervenors' own land to eastern portions
must be through Pine Canyon. Stock in
limited numbers and in single file can be
moved from the Sawmill Canyon Road through
Pine Canyon to the eastern grazing area.
Moving the stock back down Pine Canyon is
even more limited, difficult and treacherous.
Herding stock through Pine Canyon, then, does
not constitute traditional grazing access.
This is consistent with the testimony of
Richard Huffman in the second partition
trial. Mr. Huffman did not even consider
Pine Canyon for access. Additionally, earth
moving equipment cannot create a stock trail
through Pine Canyon for traditional grazing
access. The evidence did establish, however,
that as many as 150 head of cattle can be
moved the length of the Sawmill Canyon Road
over plaintiff's parcels to the eastern
portions of intervener's parcels in less than
a full day.
(Summary Decision, at 11-12, R. 781-82.)

The court's findings

were memorialized in Findings of Fact Nos. 25-26.

(R. 883-84.)

The lower court's findings regarding accessibility through Pine
Canyon or through Thirtyfive Canyon were supported by ample
testimony presented at trial.

(Tr. Vol. I, at 32-35, 37-38, 45-

46, 137, 144.)
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The evidence was virtually undisputed that, without the
right to use the Sawmill Canyon Road where it crosses Shirley
Gillmor's property, Edward L. Gillmor and Charles F. Gillmor have
no other practical way to move sheep and cattle to the eastern
portions of their property.

Without vehicular access over

Shirley Gillmor's property via the Sawmill Canyon Road, 80
percent of the 1284 acres awarded to Edward L. Gillmor is
unusable, making the property "nearly completely worthless" (Tr.
Vol. I, 36.)

Having no right to use the road "would terminate"

his cattle and livestock operation on the property. (Tr. Vol. I,
at 47.)

Similarly, 98 percent of Charles F. Gillmor's property

is useless without access over the road in its entirety.

(Tr.

Vol I, at 137.)
6.

The Error in the Description of the Easement
in the Partition Decree.

The primary issue in the Partition Action was how to
divide all of the properties owned in common by the parties and
which particular theory of partition ought to be utilized.6

The

6

This Court described the issues in the Partition Action
in its 1982 opinion:
The major dispute is whether the property
should be partitioned in kind according to the
cotenants' pro rata share of the value of the
land so as to permit plaintiffs to continue
operation of their cattle ranch in a similar
manner to which they have heretofore operated
it (plaintiffs' plan), or whether the acreage
should be partitioned in kind with each
(continued...)
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issue of access was undisputed.

All parties assumed that,

whichever theory of partition was followed, they would be given
full access to the property awarded to them,

Florence Gillmor

and Charles F. Gillmor jointly filed a "Petition Relating to
Procedure to be Followed in Partitioning Land," in 1976 in which
they requested the court to divide each parcel at issue into four
equal parcels with "cross easements to be awarded all parties to
provide traditional means of access to each tract."
50, at 1.)

(Exhibit D-

Rights of access were never disputed in the Partition

Action.
During the first trial in the Partition Action, the
parties and their counsel traveled over the Sawmill Canyon Road
to the top of the plateau, for the purpose of inspecting the
property and the available access.
129-32. ) 7

(Tr. Vol. I, at 49-50, 76,

Edward L. Gillmor, Jr., and Charles F. Gillmor, who

6

(...continued)
cotenant receiving his prorata share of the
acreage (defendants' plan). The trial court
chose the latter, and plaintiffs appeal.

637 P.2d at 737.

7

Edward L. Gillmor, Jr., placed an asterisk on Exhibit 30
and wrote the word "Trip" at the spot where the parties and their
counsel stopped during their trip to the Sawmill property during
the Partition Action. (Tr. Vol. I, at 53.) When the court made
its inspection of the property during the trial of the present
case, the vehicle stopped at approximately the same spot. (Tr. Vol
II, at 44-45.)
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were adversaries in the Partition Action (Tr. Vol. I, at 128),
were both present during the trip.

Both testified at the trial

of the present action that there was a mutual agreement between
the parties during the trip that, regardless of how the Sawmill
property was partitioned, access would be available by the
Sawmill Canyon Road.

(Tr. Vol. I, at 59-60, 130-32, 143-45, 148,

162. )
During the Partition Action in 1977, following the trip
to the Sawmill property, Florence Gillmor and Charles F. Gillmor
submitted a proposal entitled "Proposed Division of Appurtenant
Rights" which, significantly, proposed that the access to the
Sawmill property be available for all of the parties along the
entirety of the Sawmill property.
70-71. ) 8

(Exhibit D-44; Tr. Vol. I, at

Florence Gillmor and Charles F. Gillmor also submitted

with the proposal a "Motion" requesting that the court "view the
easements as items of continuing jurisdiction."

(Exhibit D-51.)

After remand following the first appeal, a second trial
was held in 1980, during which counsel for Charles F. Gillmor
introduced Exhibit 113-D (marked as Exhibit D-46 in the present

8

At the trial of the present action, Edward L. Gillmor,
Jr., plotted the description contained in Exhibit D-44 on the map,
Exhibit 30, using black ink. The road described in the Exhibit D44 terminated on the eastern portion of the property awarded to
Edward L. Gillmor. (Tr. Vol. I, at 70-71.) Charles F. Gillmor,
whose lawyer prepared Exhibit D-44 during the Partition Action,
agreed with Edward L. Gillmor, Jr.'s testimony regarding the
plotting of the description contained in Exhibit D-44. (Tr. Vol.
I, at 132. )
-15G:\WPL\088\00000DAA.W51

case) which purported to give a detailed description of all
access roads and rights of way for all of the properties at issue
in the Partition Action.

The exhibit was admitted by stipulation

of counsel on the condition that it would be subject to
modification if it was not reasonable. A copy of the trial
transcript reflecting the stipulation was admitted as Exhibit D47 in the present action.

The description contained in Exhibit

113-D was eventually used in the Partition Decree (Exhibit 2, at
26. )
Exhibit 113-D (Exhibit D-46 in the present case) was in
error.

It described only a portion of the Sawmill Canyon Road

and terminated in the middle of the property awarded to Florence
Gillmor, approximately one mile from the southern border of her
property.

(Tr. Vol. I, at 62-64.) At the trial of the present

action, Charles F. Gillmor testified that the description
prepared by his lawyer in Exhibit D-46 was an error and was not
what was intended by the parties.

(Tr. Vol. I, at 136.) Under

the description prepared by his lawyer, Charles F. Gillmor has
access to approximately five acres of the 1284 acres awarded to
him and has no access for livestock purposes.
137.)

(Tr. Vol. I, at

He testified in the present case that he left the matter

of the description up to his lawyer who, apparently, failed to
catch the mistake.

(Tr. Vol. I, at 138-39.)
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Edward L. Gillmor,

Jr., confirmed that the description was an error.

(Tr. Vol. I,

at 63.)
Prior to his death, Shirley Gillmor's decedent, Stephen
T. Gillmor, gave evidence that the Sawmill Canyon Road provided
the only access to the Sawmill property.

At the first trial of

the Partition Action, he testified that all parties would have to
have access by way of the road:
Q.
[By Mr. Lee] With respect to the
various parcels, if a division were to be
made by this Court, would it be necessary to
have access up the road you've referred to
across the various parcels? Would that
access have to be available to all parties?
A.
Definitely so. The topography is
so steep and rugged in the rear portion of
this it is the only vehicle access into the
area.
So very definitely, this access would be
— have to be left open for all parties to
make use of the parcel.
(Transcript of First Trial in Partition Action, at 335).9

No

evidence was introduced at the trial of this action that Florence
Gillmor had a different intent during the Partition Action.

9

Quoted in Edward L. Gillmor's Post-Trial Memorandum (R.
762), at 3, and by counsel during closing argument. (Tr. Vol. II,
at 179.) The lower court in the present case agreed to take
judicial notice of the entire court file in the Partition Action,
on the motion of Shirley Gillmor's counsel, to which no objection
was made.
(Tr. Vol. I, at 11-13.) The quoted portion of the
transcript was submitted to the trial court in the present case by
counsel for Shirley Gillmor. (Tr. Vol. II, at 179-80.)
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7.

Inconsistencies Between the Descriptions in
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
and the Partition Decree.

Although the Partition Decree utilized the erroneous
description contained in Exhibit 113-D (Exhibit D-46 in the
present case), the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law issued
in the Partition Action contained a different description of the
easement, more consistent with the intent of the parties.10 In
the Findings of Fact, at p. 21, the trial court in the Partition
Action made the following finding describing the Sawmill
property:
Acres:

5139 more less

Division: Each 1284.75 acres more or less.
Equal in quantity and quality.
Division into parcels will not
decrease value of the whole. Can
be partitioned without great
prejudice to owners.
Present Use: Grazing.
Highest and Best Use: Grazing and
recreational.
Improvements:

Fencing, stock ponds, corrals.

Stock Trails: Across Wright property to
get to grazing land, Thirtyfive
Canyon. See access.
Water:

Developed springs in Sections 21, 23, 26;

10

The Findings and Conclusions in the Partition Action were
admitted as Exhibit 33 in the present action. The page from the
Findings and Conclusions containing the description of the easement
was also received as Exhibit 31 in the present case.
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spring in Sawmill Canyon Section
33.
Access: On existing road from 1-15
frontage road across Wright
property in mouth of Sawmill
Canyon.
At the trial of the present case, Edward L. Gillmor,
Jr., testified that the description quoted above was
consistent with the access he and his father had always used
on the property and with the intent of the parties that access
be given over the entirety of the Sawmill Canyon Road.
Vol. I, at 65-69.)

(Tr.

He testified further that the description

at page 21 of the Findings of Fact were inconsistent with the
description of the right of way in the Partition Decree, which
only described part of the road.
8.

(Tr. Vol. I, at 114-15.) n

Richard Huffman's Mistake in Describing
the Road.

The description of the road in the Partition Decree
(Exhibit 2) and in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
(Exhibit 33) were prepared by Richard Huffman, who had been
hired by Florence Gillmor and Charles F. Gillmor as an expert
in the Partition Action.

(Tr. Vol. I, at 149-50, 215.)

He

testified in the present case that,-in connection with the
first trial of the Partition Action, he was charged with

11

The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in the
Partition Action, at 60, also contained a legal description of the
property identical to the description ultimately used in the
Partition Decree.
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dividing up the various parcels based on "[e]qual acreage and
equal usability."

(Tr. Vol. I, at 192.)12

At the second

trial, his charge included preparing easement descriptions.
(Tr. Vol. I, at 193-94.)

He prepared the description of the

Sawmill Canyon Road used in Exhibit 113-D (Exhibit D-46 in the
present case), which was subsequently used in the Partition
Decree.

He did so at the request of Charles F. Gillmor's

lawyer.

(Tr. Vol. I, at 194.)
Huffman's testimony in the present case showed that

his description used in the Partition Action was based on two
erroneous assumptions.

He assumed that cattle could be moved

onto the Sawmill property from the state highway through the
south end of Thirtyfive Canyon.

(Tr. Vol. I, at 212, 218. ) 13

Huffman also assumed that there was a livestock right of way
from the highway to the mouth of Thirtyfive Canyon, across the
Wright's property.

(Tr. Vol. I, at 219-21.)

Both of these assumptions were in error.

The trial

court in the present case specifically found that there is no
access for grazing from the south entrance to Thirtyfive

12

Huffman testified in the present case that he divided the
Sawmill Property so as to arrive at four parcels of equal usability
for the "highest and best use of the land," which he determined was
grazing and "some limited recreational value." (Tr. Vol. I, at
207, 215.)
13

During the Partition Action, Huffman observed the Sawmill
property twice from aircraft, and once from the highway. (Tr. Vol.
I, at 197.)
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Canyon.

(Finding of Fact No. 26, R. 884.)14

Further, there

is no access to the bottom of Thirtyfive Canyon over the
Wright's property.

Dennis Wright, who owns the property

between the Gillmor property and the highway, testified that
there is no livestock right-of-way access across his land to
Thirtyfive Canyon.

(Tr. Vol. II, at 61.) On cross-

examination in the present case, Huffman admitted that there
is no access to Thirtyfive Canyon across the Wright property.
(Tr. Vol. I, at 222.)
Asked to assume that there was no access to the
Sawmill property through Thirty-five Canyon, as the trial
court subsequently found, Huffman conceded that there would be
no access to the property from the highway.

Nor was he aware

of any easement to cross the Wright property to the mouth of
Thirtyfive Canyon.

(Tr. Vol. I, at 220-25.) Thus, the

description of the road in the Partition Decree was in error.
It did not give Edward L. Gillmor and Charles F. Gillmor
access to their property for grazing purposes. Huffman's
testimony was consistent with the trial court's finding in the
present case that without the use of the Sawmill Canyon Road,
neither Edward L. Gillmor nor Charles F. Gillmor would have

14

Edward L. Gillmor, Jr., similarly testified that there
was no access from the south end of Thirtyfive Canyon which is
"almost vertical." (Tr. Vol. I, at 37-38.)
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access for grazing purposes to their property.

(Findings of

Fact Nos. 25-27, R. 883-84.)
9.

Discovery of the Mistake in the
Description of the Sawmill Canyon Road in
the Partition Decree.

The error in the description of the road in the
Partition Decree remained undiscovered by Edward L. Gillmor
until 1987. Following the Partition Decree, Edward L. Gillmor
believed that he had the right to use the Sawmill Canyon Road
to gain access to the eastern portion of his property.

After

the entry of the decree, until 1983; he made no use of the
Sawmill property pursuant to a stipulation under which Stephen
T. Gillmor was given the sole right to use the property.

(Tr.

Vol. I, at 41.) After 1983 Edward L. Gillmor used his portion
of the Sawmill property to graze horses and, after 1987,
cattle.15

He gained access to his property by using the

Sawmill Canyon Road, as he had traditionally done, believing
that he had the right to use the road and because there was no
other access.

(Tr. Vol. I, at 41-42, 65, 122-23.)

Edward L. Gillmor and Charles F. Gillmor did not
discover the error in the legal description of the Sawmill
Canyon Road until the preliminary injunction hearing held on
September 25, 1987, when they heard Stephen T. Gillmor testify

15

In 1987, the property between Edward L. Gillmor and
Shirley Gillmor was fenced, which allowed the property to be used
for the grazing of cattle. (Tr. Vol. I, at 43-44.)
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that neither Edward nor Charles Gillmor had access over the
Sawmill Canyon Road from the gate onward.
111-12, 123, 139.)16

(Tr. Vol. I, at

After hearing that testimony, Edward L.

Gillmor retained legal counsel to pursue his claims that he
should have the right to use the road.

(Tr. Vol. I, at 65.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

All of the elements necessary for the

implication of an easement along the Sawmill Canyon Road were
established.

The court's refusal to imply an easement based

on "traditional notions of finality 1! was in error as a matter
of law.

Edward L. Gillmor's claims are not barred by res

judicata nor collateral estoppel.
2.

All of the elements necessary to find an

easement by necessity along the Sawmill Canyon Road were
established.

The court's refusal to allow an easement based

on "traditional notions of finality" was in error as a matter
of law.

Edward L. Gillmor's claims are not barred by res

judicata nor collateral estoppel.
3.

The description of the Sawmill Canyon Road in

the Partition Decree was an error.

All of the parties to the

Partition Action intended that, regardless of how the property
was divided, full access would be given along the Sawmill

16

See Stephen T. Gillmor's testimony at the preliminary
injunction hearing. (Transcript of preliminary injunction hearing
Sept. 25, 1987, R. 936, at 116.)
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Canyon Road, as they had traditionally had.

The court erred,

as a matter of law, in not holding that Edward L. Gillmor's
claims were properly brought by way of an independent action
in equity.

The court's finding that the lower court did not

intend to give Edward L. Gillmor and Charles F. Gillmor access
over Shirley Gillmor's property was clearly erroneous and
against the weight of the evidence.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT EDWARD L.
GILLMOR WAS NOT ENTITLED TO AN EASEMENT BY IMPLICATION
OVER THE ENTIRETY OF THE SAWMILL CANYON ROAD.
A.

The Evidence and the Court's Findings Establish All
of the Elements for Implication of an Easement Over
the Entirety of the Sawmill Canyon Road.
It was undisputed at trial that the description of

the Sawmill Canyon Road in the Partition Decree was in error.
In the present case, the party who made the mistake, Charles
F. Gillmor, concedes the error and joins in this action
seeking a modification to remedy the error.

The error was

apparently created by Charles F. Gillmor's expert witness,
Richard Huffman, who prepared Exhibit 113-D (Exhibit D-46 in
the present action) which contained the erroneous description.
(Tr. Vol. I, at 138-39, 194.)

The error left both Edward L.

Gillmor and Charles F. Gillmor essentially landlocked, unable
to use nearly all of the property awarded to them.
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Rights of access were never in dispute in the
Partition Action.
should be used.

The only issue was what theory of partition

Florence Gillmor and Charles F. Gillmor

themselves proposed in the Partition Action that "cross
easements" should be "awarded to all parties to provide
traditional means of access to each tract."

(Exhibit D-50.)

Richard Huffman, who originated the erroneous description,
testified that he sought to divide the parcels so as to be as
nearly equal as possible.

Yet, his description of the Sawmill

Canyon Road was based on erroneous assumptions.

He assumed

that there was access from the bottom of Thirtyfive Canyon and
an easement across the Wright property to Thirtyfive Canyon.
Without an alternate means of access, as assumed by Huffman,
both Edward L. Gillmor and Charles F. Gillmor are landlocked,
without the ability to move vehicles and livestock to their
property for grazing purposes.
so found.

The trial court specifically

(Finding of Fact No. 25, R. 884.)
In his Summary Decision in the present case, the

trial court stated that the Supreme Court anticipated that
Edward L. Gillmor's grazing rights would be affected.
781.)

(R.

Yet, the trial court in the Partition Action clearly

intended the parties to have roughly equivalent parcels of
property, equal in quantity and quality, and that all parties
be treated fairly with respect to access.
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The Findings of

Fact in the Partition Action described the Sawmill property as
follows:
Equal in quantity and quality.
Division into parcels will not
decrease value of the whole.
Can be partitioned without great
prejudice to owners.
(Exhibit 33, at 21.)
The mistaken description of the Sawmill Canyon Road
left the parties without a semblance of equality.

Shirley

Gillmor has the right to bring vehicles and livestock over the
Sawmill Canyon Road where it crosses the property awarded to
Edward L. Gillmor and to Charles F. Gillmor.
other hand, have no similar right.

They, on the

The trial court's finding,

quoted above, in the Partition Action that the property could
be "partitioned without great prejudice to owners" is simply
false unless Edward and Charles are given the right to use the
Sawmill Canyon Road, as they have traditionally done.
In his Counterclaim, Edward L. Gillmor stated a
claim that he is entitled to use the Sawmill Canyon Road where
it crosses Shirley Gillmor's property as an easement by
implication.

In Ovard v. Cannon , 600 P.2d 1246 (Utah 1979),

this Court described the elements of an easement by
implication:
[A] previous unity of title, followed by
severance; that at the time of the
severance the servitude was so plainly
apparent that any prudent observer should
-26G:\WPL\088\00000DAA.W51

have been aware of it; that the easement
is reasonably necessary to the use and
enjoyment of the dominant estate; and it
must have been continuous, at least in the
sense that it is used by the possessor
whenever he desires.
Id. at 1247 (footnote omitted).

See Adamson v. Brockbank, 112

Utah 52, 185 P.2d 264, 272 (1947).
According to this Court in Watkins v. Simonds, 11
Utah 2d 46, 354 P.2d 852 (1960),
"[A]n easement created by implication
arises as an inference of the intention of
the parties to a conveyance of land. The
inference is drawn from the circumstances
under which the conveyance was made rather
than the language of the conveyance.M
354 P.2d at 854 (emphasis added) (quoting Restatement
of Real Property

(First)

476, at 2978).

The Court in Morris v. Blunt , 49 Utah 243, 161
P.1127 (1916), similarly stated:
When an owner of a tract of land has
arranged and adapted the various parts so
that one derives a benefit and advantage
from the other of a continuous and obvious
character, and he sells one of the parts
without making mention of the incidental
advantage or burdens of one in respect to
the other, there is implied an
understanding and agreement that such
advantages and burdens continue as before
the separation of title.
161 P. at 1132 (citations omitted).- See Tschaggenv v. Union
Pacific Land Resources. 555 P.2d 277, 280 (Utah 1976) ("Where a
party conveys a portion of land which he owns, he impliedly
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conveys all those apparent or visible easements over the land
retained, which at the time of the conveyance are used by the
grantor for the benefit of the part conveyed and which are
reasonably necessary for the use thereof") (emphasis added).
The need for the easement need not be proven as being
strictly necessary,

A finding of reasonable necessity is all

that must be shown.

The court in Cotter v. Moore , 634 S.W.2d

332 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982), upheld a judgment awarding an
easement by implication, noting that the necessity that must be
shown "is not used in the strictest sense, but means only that
such use is necessary for the convenient and comfortable
enjoyment of the property as it existed when the severance was
made."

Id . at 336•
In the present case, the evidence demonstrated, and

the trial court so found, that the use of the Sawmill Canyon
Road is not only reasonably but also strictly necessary to
Edward L. Gillmor and Charles F. Gillmor. Without it, there is
no possible way for them to obtain access to the eastern
portions of their property for grazing their livestock.
The fact that the common ownership of the Sawmill
property was severed by a judicial decree of partition and not
by a voluntary alienation should make no difference in the
present case.

Courts will imply an easement across a servient

parcel of property partitioned by judicial decree if the other
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elements are met.

In Deisenroth v. Dodge , 7 111. 2d 340f 131

N.E.2d 17 (1956), the court affirmed a judgment awarding an
easement by implication over property that had previously been
partitioned by judicial decree.

The court stated:

This doctrine of implied easements is not
limited to cases of direct conveyance by
deed of the common owner, but applies to
severance of unity of title by judicial
proceedings of any character, including
judgment in partition proceedings, if all
other essentials are present.
Id. at 21 (citation omitted; emphasis added).
P. Rowen, Powell on Real Property

See R. Powell &

410, at 34-72, 73 (rev.

perm. ed. 1987); Mesmer v. Uharriet. 174 Cal. 110, 162 P. 104
(1916) (court held that property landlocked after decree of
partition may obtain right of way of necessity).
The evidence at trial established all of the elements
necessary for an easement by implication.

The Sawmill property

was originally owned jointly by Edward L. Gillmor, Charles F.
Gillmor, and Florence Gillmor.

That unity of interest was

partitioned by the decree of the court without making specific
provision for traditional access to the property awarded to
Edward and Charles.

The lower court erred in failing to hold

that they have an easement by implication over the entirety of
the Sawmill Canyon Road.
B.

The Lower Court Erred in Holding that Implication of
an Easement is Barred by Notions of Finality Inherent
in the Doctrines of Res Judicata and Collateral
Estoppel.
-29-
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In its Summary Decision, the lower court rested its
decision on the importance of finality:
Intervenors suggest that the Judgment and
Decree of Partition is no impediment to an
order of this court granting an easement by
implication or necessity. Such an order,
however, would violate traditional notions
of finality inherent in the doctrines of
res judicata and collateral estoppel.
(R. 784.)
Traditional notions of finality should not prevent
the implication of an easement where all the elements have been
met.

Neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel should bar

implication of an easement in this case.

In Madsen v.

Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988), this Court described the
elements of res judicata, also known as claim preclusion:
Claim preclusion bars a cause of action
only if the suit in which that cause of
action is being asserted and the prior suit
satisfy three requirements. First, both
cases must involve the same parties or
their privies. Second, the claim that is
alleged to be barred must have been
presented in the first suit or must have
been one that could and should have been
raised in the first action. Third, the
first suit must have resulted in a final
judgment on the merits.
Id. at 247 (citations omitted.)

See Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d

1369, 1374 n.5 (Utah 1988).
Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, bars
relitigation of an issue actually decided in a previous action
between the same parties or their privies.
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Swainston v.

Intermountain Health Care, Inc. 766 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah
1988).
The issue whether an easement should be implied
following the division of the Sawmill property has never been
litigated or raised in any action between these parties.
Implication of an easement was not an issue in the Partition
Action, nor should it have been raised as an issue.
Implication of an easement is necessary precisely because the
parties in the Partition Action mutually erred in failing to
describe an adequate access over the Sawmill Canyon Road.

By

definition an easement can only be implied after a conveyance
of real property by common grantors which, in this case, was
ordered by judicial decree.

The issue whether to imply an

easement could not have arisen during the Partition Action, and
so should not have been deemed barred by the trial court.
Issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, is
similarly unavailing as a bar to implication of an easement.
That issue was never raised nor litigated in the Partition
Action.

It has never been raised between these parties until

the present action.
To be sure, the trial court did not specifically rest
its ruling on the doctrines of res judicata and collateral
estoppel, but, rather, focused on "notions of finality"
inherent in those doctrines.

(R. 784.) The court appears to
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have perceived an additional penumbral doctrine behind the
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, under which,
in the trial court's view, a final decree may not be disturbed,
even if it is to correct an undisputed error.

Aware of the

history of litigation between these parties, the lower court
also seemed concerned about fostering further actions between
them.17
The trial court's apprehensions are simply unfounded.
Implication of an easement under these circumstances will not
open the floodgates to new litigation over the Partition
Decree.

It will allow both Charles and Edward Gillmor, who

were adversaries in the Partition Action, to have the access
that was intended for them in that case; it will correct an
error that has denied them the use of most of their property;
and it will demonstrate the importance of the rule of law by
recognizing the validity of this Court's prior opinions
regarding the implication of easements.

If all of the elements

have been met, as they have in this case, then an easement
should be implied, regardless of the risks of spawning future
litigation.

17

The court stated: "Courts should not provide inspiration
to these parties to continue litigating the partition case ad
infinitum." (R. 784.)
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II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT EDWARD L.
GILLMOR IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN EASEMENT BY NECESSITY
OVER THE ENTIRETY OF THE SAWMILL CANYON ROAD.
Edward L. Gillmor and Charles F. Gillmor also claim
the right to use the Sawmill Canyon Road on the theory that it
constitutes a way of necessity.

A way or easement by necessity

shares some of the elements of an easement by implication
except that it need not be shown that at the time of the
severance the servitude created by the easement was apparent,
obvious, and visible.

Nor need it be shown that it was

continuous or self-acting.

In Tschaaaenv v. Union Pacific Land

Resources, Corp., 555 P.2d 277 (Utah 1976), this Court stated:
[A] way of necessity arises when there is a
conveyance of a part of a tract of land
which is so situated that either the part
conveyed or the part retained is surrounded
with no access to a road to the outer
world. In either case, there is an implied
grant or reservation of a way across the
part not so surrounded unless it clearly
appears that the parties to the conveyance
did not intend such an easement. However,
it is not necessary that the easement be
visible, apparent, or obvious.
Id. at 281.
The Court in Tschaaaenv also noted that it need not
be shown that the easement was continuous and self-acting.
at 280.

Id.

See Savage v. Nielsen, 114 Utah 22, 197 P.2d 117

(1948) (Court stated that if a common grantor conveys a tract
that is landlocked without mentioning a means of ingress and
-33G:\WPL\088\00000DAA.W51

egress "it is presumed that he intended to create a servient
estate in himself to the extent of a right-of-way in favor of
the other tract of land"); Hewitt v. Meanev, 181 Cal. App. 3d
367, 226 Cal. Rptr. 349 (1986) ("The law under certain
circumstances recognizes an implied easement or way of
necessity to landlocked parcels of realty based on public
policy favoring their use and development"); R. Howell and P.
Rowen, Powell on Real Property

410, at 34-67, 68 (rev. perm,

ed. 1987).
The present case is similar to Wagner v. Fairlamb,
151 Colo. 481, 379 P.2d 165 (1963).

There, the court upheld

the finding of a way of necessity across a tract of property
that formerly belonged to a common grantor.

The court noted

that there are three requirements for a way of necessity:

(1)

original ownership of the entire tract by a single grantor
prior to the division thereof; (2) the existence of a necessity
at the time of the severance; and (3) that the necessity for
the particular right-of-way be great. .Id. at 168. The court
noted that, according to the evidence, the area in question was
"a very mountainous, rocky area with steep canyon walls, where
roads at best are hazardous, expensive and dangerous to build."
Id . The court observed further that the road in question "is
under all the circumstances the only practical method of
affording ingress and egress for the purpose of mining or
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otherwise using the south half of the Bradley."

Id.

Similarly, in Beck v. Mills, 616 S.W.2d 353 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1981), the court upheld the finding of an easement by
implication based, in part, on the evidence that "a mountain
range made another approach highly impractical, and that at the
time of the partition there was no roadway across these
mountains."

Ixi. at 354.

The parallel between Wagner and Beck and the present
case is clear.

Edward L. Gillmor and Charles F. Gillmor simply

have no other way than the Sawmill Canyon Road by which to move
sheep and cattle to the eastern portion of their property
because of the mountainous and rugged terrain.

The Sawmill

Canyon is burdened on each side by steep cliffs over which
livestock are unable to pass. Without the right to use the
road, that portion of their property will be useless to Edward
L. Gillmor and Charles F. Gillmor.
The facts in the present case justify a finding of
way of necessity.

There was unity of ownership, the right of

way has always been necessary to access the landlocked parcel,
and the right of way is necessary even under the strictest
standard of necessity.

This Court should hold that the trial

court erred in not so holding.

As argued above, the lower

court's reliance on "notions of finality" should not bar the
claims at issue here.
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III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT EDWARD L.
GILLMOR WAS NOT ENTITLED TO AN ORDER REFORMING
OR CORRECTING THE DESCRIPTION OF THE SAWMILL
CANYON ROAD IN THE PARTITION DECREE ON
THE GROUNDS OF MUTUAL MISTAKE.
A.

The Description of the Sawmill Canyon Road in the
Partition Decree was a Mutual Mistake and the Court
Should Have Modified the Description Pursuant to the
Independent Action in Equity Brought by Edward L.
Gillmor and Charles F. Gillmor.
In his Counterclaim, Edward L. Gillmor alleged that

the erroneous description of the Sawmill Canyon Road contained
in the Partition Decree was the result of a mutual mistake of
fact on the part of the parties and the trial court in the
Partition Action.

The Counterclaim stated a claim to modify

the Partition Decree by way of an independent action, as
provided under Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

That

rule allows a court to entertain "an independent action to
relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set
aside a judgment for fraud upon the court."

On this basis,

Edward L. Gillmor sought an order of the court in the present
action reforming or correcting the description so as to
describe the Sawmill Canyon Road in its entirety, including the
portion of the road running from plaintiff's property through
the easterly portions of the Sawmill property belonging to
Edward L. Gillmor and Charles F. Gillmor.
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The trial court held that the Partition Decree cannot
be modified under the provisions of Rule 60(b) to correct the
mistake.
(R. 885.)

To do so would undermine the finality of a judgment.
The court erred in so holding.

This Court has

previously recognized that a mistake of fact or false
assumption may provide relief to a party under Rule 60(b)(7) or
pursuant to an independent action, regardless of the amount of
time that has passed.

In Eaan v. Eqan, 560 P.2d 704 (Utah

1977), the Court considered an independent action in equity by
the plaintiff seeking relief from a divorce decree that
determined that he was the father of the defendant's child.
The Court held that the relief from the judgment could well
have been justified on the grounds of fraud.

The Court stated

further that
mistake of fact may be grounds under an
action in equity to grant relief as
provided under Rule 60(b)(7) it states
[sic] "any other reason justifying relief
from the operation of a judgment."
Further, the Supreme Court of this state
has ruled erroneous assumptions may be
grounds for entering a new order.
Id. at 705-06 (footnote omitted; emphasis added).

See Stewart

v. Sullivan, 29, Utah 2d 156, 506 P.2d 74, 76 ("The provisions
of Rule 60(b)(7) are sufficiently broad to permit the court to
set aside its former order which appeared to have been entered
upon an erroneous assumption and to enter a new order based
upon the record before it"); Nev v. Harrison, 5 Utah 2d 217,
-37G:\WPL\088\00000D4A.W51

299 P.2d 1114, 1116 (1956) (Court held that the plaintiff was
entitled to relief from a judgment under Rule 60(b)(7) on
mistaken belief that her husband was responsible for debt owed
to plaintiff under terms of divorce decree).
The equitable power of a court to correct or modify a
judgment is available where, as in the present case, the
judgment contains an inaccurate property description.

In the

case of West Virginia Oil & Gas Co. v. George E. Breece Lumber,
213 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1954), the court had before it an appeal
from the dismissal of an independent action in equity filed by
the plaintiff under Federal Rule 60(b)18 seeking correction of
an error in a property description contained in a judgment in
an earlier case between the parties! Noting that the prior
judgment had been entered approximately six or seven years
prior to the commencement of the independent action, the
opinion observed that "the desire of courts to repair an
injustice wrought by a judgment will overcome the necessity for
finality where it is against conscience to execute that
judgment and where that judgment was rendered without fault or
neglect on the part of the party seeking to reform it."

18

Ld. at

Because Federal Rule 60(b) is identical in pertinent part
to Utah Rule 60(b) Federal court opinions are helpful in
interpreting the Utah rule. This Court observed in Winegar v. Slim
Olsen, 122 Utah 487, 252 P. 2d 205 (1953), that since the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure were fashioned after the Federal Rules, "it is
proper that we examine decisions under the federal rules to
determine the meaning thereof." Id . at 207.
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704.

The court reversed the dismissal, and held that the

reformation of a mistake in the judgment was the proper subject
of an independent action.

The court stated further:

The independent suit in equity, as a remedy
for relief from mistake, however, has been
shrouded with the same lore and mystery as
the ancillary writs. Fortunately, in 1935
the Supreme Court decided the case of State
of Wisconsin v. State of Michigan, 295 U.S.
455, 55 S.Ct. 786, 79 L.Ed. 1541, wherein a
former judgment based on mutual mistake of
the parties was corrected in a subsequent
independent proceeding. There, as here,
the parties consented to a decree dividing
certain land between them. It developed
that through mutual mistake of the parties
the decree agreed upon and signed by the
court was in error in that the dividing
line therein contained was not a dividing
line actually intended by the parties. The
Supreme Court, without discussing the
principles involved and simply citing the
case of Thompson v. Maxwell, 95 U.S. 391,
397, 399, 24 L.Ed. 481, decided that the
court had jurisdiction to correct the
decree. Since Thompson v. Maxwell was a
suit between private litigants to reform a
judgment relating to land, it can be safely
assumed that the Supreme Court's decision
in State of Wisconsin v. State of Michigan
should not be limited to cases of original
jurisdiction in the Supreme Court.
In an excellent article entitled,
"Federal Relief from Final Judgment,"
published in 55 Yale Law Journal 623, 655659, Professor Moore and his associate
carefully analyzed the Supreme Court's
decisions on this subject and conclude, as
this court does, that a federal court, in
an independent action, has jurisdiction to
modify a final judgment in a former
proceeding on the ground of mistake as well
as fraud, at least where mutual mistake is
shown and where the party seeking relief is
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without fault or negligence in the
premises.
Id. at 706 (emphasis added)-19

See 11 C. Wright & A. Miller,

Federal Practice & Procedure

2868, at 239-40 (1973) (an

independent action for relief from a judgment will lie on the
basis of accident or of mistake.)
An independent action for relief from a judgment need
not be filed in the same court rendering the judgment.
Wright & A. Miller, supra

11 C.

2868, at 242-43 & n.24; Locklin v.

Switzer Brothers, Inc., 335 F.2d 331, 334 (7th Cir. 1964),
cert, denied, 379 U.S. 962 (1965) ("The independent equitable
action may be maintained in any court exercising equitable
jurisdiction"); Carr v. District of Colombia, 543 F.2d 917, 927
N.83 (1976) ("Independent actions left open by Fed. R. Civ. P.
60(b) are not confined to the court that rendered the judgment
attacked, but may be brought in any other court of competent
jurisdiction").

The present case is filed in the same court,

although in a different county.
In ordering the dismissal of Edward L. Gillmor's
Counterclaim, the trial court apparently held that the "catchall" provisions of Rule 60(b)(7) could not be invoked to grant

19

The Breece Lumber opinion goes on to state that "[t]he
conclusion of Professor Moore in this regard is apparently adopted
by the Advisory Committee of Federal Rules for, in its note to the
1946 amendment of Rule 60, Professor Moore's article and the pages
thereof specifically relating to this subject are cited with
approval." 213 F.2d at 706 (citation omitted).
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relief from a judgment on grounds of mutual mistake.
of Fact No. 31, R. 885.)

(Finding

In so holding the trial court

overlooked the fact that Edward L. Gillmor's claims were
brought by way of an independent claim in equity, which is
specifically authorized by Rule 60(b), and for which there is
no statute of limitation.20

It is an equitable claim which

the trial court, sitting in equity, had jurisdiction to
consider on the merits.

The trial court erred in refusing to

remedy the obvious mistake made by the parties and the court in
the Partition Action.
At the trial of the Partition Action the parties
specifically agreed that errors in the legal descriptions of
rights of way could be corrected thereafter if necessary.
During the trial of that case, Charles F. Gillmor submitted
Exhibit 113-D (Exhibit D-46 in the present case), with the

20

Although motions to set aside a judgment under Rule
60(b)(1) through (4) are subject to a three month statute of
limitation, there is no time limit on when an independent action
may be brought.
See
11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal
Practice & Procedure
2868, at 241; In re Casco Chemical
Company , 335 F.2d 645, 652 (5th Cir. 1964) ("We have clearly held
that when the 60(b) relief is sought by an independent action,
there is no time limit save laches on when the action may be
brought"); Crosby v. Mills , 413 F.2d 1273, 1276 (10th Cir. 1969)
(Rule 60(b) "permits an independent action and prescribes no time
limitations for such action"); West Virginia Oil & Gas Co. Inc. v.
George E. Breece Lumber Co., Inc., 213 F.2d 702, 706-07 (5th Cir.
1954) (court held that independent action was proper to correct
error in property description in nine year old judgment); Carr v.
District of Columbia, 543 F.2d 917, 926 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (court
held that only method of litigating a claim that is time-barred
under Rule 60(b) is by independent action).
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stipulation of the parties that descriptions could be modified.
When he offered the exhibit in the Partition Action, counsel
for Charles F. Gillmor stated:
And the proposed stipulation is that
if Mr. Huffman were to testify, that he
would testify that he prepared those
descriptions using existing roads wherever
possible; that they are the best
descriptions he can make without an on-theground survey; and we would submit that
thev could be modified by survey and bv
further order of the court should they
prove unreasonable. And I would therefore
tender that testimony to the court as if he
were called.
(Exhibit D-47.)
This was consistent with the "Motion" filed by
Florence Gillmor and Charles F. Gillmor during the Partition
Action requesting that the court "view the easements as items
of continuing jurisdiction."

(Exhibit D-50.) This Court

should hold that Shirley Gillmor, as Florence's successor in
interest, is now estopped from taking a contrary position.
Condas v. Condas, 618 P.2d 491, 495-96 (Utah 1980); Blonauist
v. Frandsen. 694 P.2d 595, 596 (Utah 1984).
B.

The Trial Court's Finding that the Court in the
Partition Action did not Intend to Provide Edward L.
Gillmor and Charles F. Gillmor Access over the
Property Awarded to Florence Gillmor was Clearly
Erroneous and Against the Weight of the Evidence.
The trial court in the present case found that the

trial court in the Partition Action "did not intend to provide
Edward Gillmor and Charles Gillmor access over parcels awarded
-42G:\WPL\088\00000DAA.W51

to Florence Gillmor."

(Finding of Fact No. 28, R. 884.) This

finding is in error and is unsupported by any evidence.

The

only intent of the trial court in the Partition Action was to
accommodate the stipulation of the parties with respect to
easements.

The issue of rights-of-way was not the subject of

dispute on which the trial court in that case was required to
find facts.

The court merely adopted the proposed easement

set forth in Exhibit 113-D which, as shown above, contained an
erroneous description.

There is no evidence that the trial

court intended to deny both Edward L. Gillmor and Charles F.
Gillmor (whose expert prepared the description in Exhibit 113-D
and whose lawyer introduced the exhibit) traditional vehicular
and livestock access to their property.

There is no evidence

that the trial court intended a result that left both of them
essentially landlocked.

Such an intent would have clearly

contradicted the court's specific finding that the Sawmill
property could be partitioned "without great prejudice" to the
owners.

(R. 33, at 21.)
The only evidence of the parties' intent is that

Edward, Charles, and Florence all agreed that, regardless of
how the Sawmill property was divided, each would have
traditional access to the property awarded to him or her.
During the trip over the Sawmill Canyon Road in 1976, the
parties agreed that the road provided the only access to the
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property,

(Tr. Vol. I, at 59-60, 130-32, 143-45, 148, 162.)

There is no evidence that Florence had a contrary intent.
Rather, as indicated by her "Petition Relating to Procedure to
be Followed in Partitioning Land," Florence intended that
"cross easements" should be "awarded all parties to provide
traditional means of access to each tract."

(Exhibit D-50.)

Moreover, in their "Proposed Division of Appurtenant Rights,"
Florence and Charles proposed that the Sawmill property be
accessed along the Sawmill Canyon Road.

The easement described

in D-50 follows the road across the top of the property awarded
to Florence and proceeds south onto the property awarded to
Edward.

(Exhibit D-44; Tr. Vol. I, at 70-71, 132.)
Additional evidence of the trial court's intent in

the Partition Action is found in the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law (Exhibit 33, at 21),21 where the stock
trails for the Sawmill property were described as follows:
Across Wright property to get to grazing
land, Thirty Five Canyon. See access.
The description under "Access" read as follows:
On existing road from 1-15 frontage road
across Wright property in mouth of Sawmill
Canyon.

21

Exhibit 31 was also introduced at trial as page 21 from
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered in the
Partition Action, which dealt specifically with the Sawmill
Property.
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Taken together, these descriptions describe the Sawmill Canyon
Road from the point where it leaves highway 1-15, crosses the
Wright property, and proceeds across the property awarded to
Florence to terminate at the northern end of Thirtyfive Canyon.
(Tr. Vol. I, at 65-69.)
Significantly, the evidence at the trial of the
present action also showed that Richard Huffman, hired as an
expert by both Florence and Charles, was responsible for the
erroneous description of the Sawmill Canyon Road.

He testified

that, in preparing the legal description of the easement
adopted by the court in the Findings of Fact he assumed that
access was available across the Wright's property to the south
end of Thirtyfive Canyon.

(Tr. Vol. I, at 212, 218-21.) The

evidence showed, however, that these assumptions were in error.
There is no access across the Wright's property to the mouth of
Thirtyfive Canyon.

(Tr. Vol. II, at 61.)

Even if there were,

however, Thirtyfive Canyon would not provide suitable grazing
access because it is too steep.

(Finding of Fact No. 26, R.

884; Tr. Vol. I, at 37-38.)
The evidence thus demonstrated that the denial of
access over the Sawmill Canyon Road was the result of a mutual
mistake, unintended by the trial court in the Partition Action.
The lower court erred in refusing to exercise its equitable
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powers to remedy the mistake by reforming the description of
the easement in the Partition Decree,
The Partition Action was a complex case lasting over
a period of nearly ten years involving approximately 34,000
acres of ranch property.

The Findings of Fact and Conclusions

of Law (Exhibit 33) is 75 pages in length and the Partition
Decree (Exhibit 2) is 41 pages, primarily consisting of legal
descriptions for the real property and rights of way being
apportioned between the parties.

It was not until the hearing

on the preliminary injunction held before Judge Wilkinson in
the present case on September 25, 1987, that Edward L. Gillmor
learned that Stephen T. Gillmor intended to deny him access
over the Sawmill Canyon Road to the eastern portion of the
Sawmill property.

On learning of the problem, Edward sought

legal assistance.

(Tr. Vol. I, at 65.)

As additional evidence of the trial court's intent in
the Partition Action, that court specifically found that the
Sawmill property could be partitioned "without great prejudice"
to the owners.

(Exhibit 33, at 21.)

Otherwise, the court

would have ordered a sale of the Sawmill Property, as required
by Section 78-39-1. Without access to the eastern portion of
the Sawmill Property, both Edward and Charles have suffered a
great prejudice, in that a major part of the Sawmill property
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awarded to them is essentially useless for grazing
livestock.22
The Partition Decree contemplated an equal division
of all properties, with equal access. Without access to the
eastern portion of the Sawmill Property for grazing purposes,
the Sawmill Property would have been unfairly divided.
Florence Gillmor was given one-half of the Sawmill property
with full access and grazing rights.

Fairness and equity

require that Edward L. Gillmor and Charles F. Gillmor be given
the same right with respect to their property.

This Court has

the equitable power to correct the injustice to these parties
by allowing them proper access to their property, as Shirley
Gillmor has access to hers.

22

The trial court in the Partition Action found, in
Paragraph 13 of the Findings of Fact, that "[a]ll the parties
desire to utilize some portions of the partitioned properties in
future ranching operations, whether 'they conduct such operations
themselves or lease some of the properties to other ranchers."
(Exhibit 33, at 6.) Thus, the court in that case found that the
highest and best use of the Sawmill property "grazing and
recreational."
(Exhibit 33, at 21.) The court was aware that
Edward L. Gillmor's primary desire in the Partition Action was to
continue his ranching and livestock operations. Hence his desire,
according to the Supreme Court, that the grazing land not be
partitioned into "small unusable pieces." 657 P.2d at 741. It was
clearly contemplated that Edward L. Gillmor intended to utilize all
of the properties awarded to him for ranching, including the
Sawmill property. Having access to the eastern portion of the
Sawmill property awarded to him was essential to Edward as it was
to Charles. The sole access available to them was and is over the
Sawmill Canyon Road.
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Accordingly, Edward L. Gillmor urges this Court to
reverse the trial court and to order that the description of
the Sawmill Canyon Road in the Partition Decree be reformed and
corrected to describe the road in its entirety, thus giving
Edward L, Gillmor and Charles F. Gillmor the right to use the
road to gain access to the eastern portions of their property.
CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in refusing to award Edward L.
Gillmor and Charles F. Gillmor an easement by implication or by
necessity over the Sawmill Canyon Road where it crosses the
property awarded to Florence Gillmor in the Partition Action.
All of the elements for such easements were met.

The trial

court specifically found that "Edward Gillmor and Charles
Gillmor do not have traditional grazing access to eastern
portions of their Sawmill parcels unless they are allowed
access over parcels awarded to Florence Gillmor and now owned
by Shirley Gillmor."

(R. 883-84.)

The lower court's holding

that the relief sought is barred by "traditional notions of
finality" (R. 885) is in error as a matter of law.

The claims

for an easement by implication or by necessity are not barred
by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel.
The lower court also erred in refusing to reform the
description of the Sawmill Canyon Road in the Partition Decree.
The evidence established that the error in the description was

-48G:\WPL\088\00000D4A.W51

caused by mutual mistake.

As a court in equity, the lower

court should have made the requested modification.

The court's

finding that the trial court in the Partition Action intended
to deprive Edward and Charles Gillmor of traditional access to
the property awarded to them was against the clear weight of
the evidence and was clearly erroneous.
ADDENDUM
Pursuant to Rule 24(f), Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, Cross-Appellant Edward L. Gillmor has appended to
this Brief copies of the following documents:
A.

Illustrative map of the Sawmill Canyon Property,

showing boundaries and roads that were the subject of the
evidence introduced at the trial, as partially indicated on
Exhibit 30.
B.

Pertinent portions of the Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law in the Partition Action.
C.

(Exhibit 33.)

Pertinent portions of the Partition Decree.

(Exhibit 2.)
D.

Proposed Division of Appurtenant Rights, filed

in the Partition Action by Florence Gillmor and Charles F.
Gillmor.

(Exhibit D-44.)
E.

Procedure Relating to Procedure to be Followed

in Partitioning Land, filed in the Partition Action by Florence
Gillmor and Charles F. Gillmor.

(Exhibit D-50.)
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F.

Motion, filed in the Partition Action by

Florence Gillmor and Charles F. Gillmor.
DATED this . >

(Exhibit D-51.)

day of September, 1990.

VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
Richard C. Skeen
R. Stephen Marshall
By

^ jCc/^^y *•' V ^ ^ t w ^ .
i

Attorneys for CrossAppellant/Intervenor-Defendant
Edward L. Gillmor
50 South Main, Suite 1600
P. 0. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 532-3333
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused four true and correct
copies of the within and foregoing Brief of CrossAppellant/ Intervenor-Defendant Edward Leslie Gillmor to be hand
delivered this ^ ;__ day of September, 1990, to the following:
James B. Lee
John B. Wilson
Parsons, Behle & Latimer
185 South State Street
Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
D. Gilbert Athay
72 East 400 South
Suite 325
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111

p^y^/l— N A / ^
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Tab A

TabB

JAMES B. LEE
KATHLENE W. LOWE
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Defendant
Florence Gillmor
79 South State Street
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
HAROLD G. CHRISTENSEN
H. JAMES CLEGG
of and for
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendants Charles
F. Gillmor and Melba G. Gillmor
Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
* * * * *
EDWARD LESLIE GILLMOR and SIV
GILLMOR, his wife,

)
)
)
)

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

V.

)

Civil No. 223998

FLORENCE GILLMOR, CHARLES F.
GILLMOR and MELBA G. GILLMOR,
his wife,

)
)
)

Plaintiffs,

Defendants.

)
* * * * *

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for
further trial proceedings following a remand from the
Supreme Court of the State of Utah, before the aboveentitled court sitting without a jury, Peter F. Leary,
Judge, presiding, commencing on the 11th day of February,

1980, and concluding on the 4th day of March, 1980. All
parties were present and represented by counsel, plaintiffs
Edward Leslie Gillmor and Siv Gillmor being represented by
E. J. Skeen and Clifford L. Ashton, defendant Florence
Gillmor being represented by James B. Lee, and defendant
Charles F. Gillmor being represented by Harold G. Christensen
and H. James Clegg.
These final trial proceedings were conducted for
the purposes of allowing plaintiffs to present evidence with
respect to appurtenant rights in accordance with plaintiffs'
theory of partition and value, to allow plaintiffs to present
their evidence with respect to the equities involved in
abolishing plaintiffs' livestock business, and to receive
evidence offered by plaintiff Edward Leslie Gillmor pertaining
to his theory of partition that the properties be partitioned
based upon highest and best use and value, and that he be
awarded such properties as would permit him to carry on his
ranching operation.
The Court received evidence throughout the trial
from all parties in support of their respective proposals
for partition of these common properties. The Court has
considered, among other evidence, testimony regarding
historical use of the property by the Gillmor family, its
present use, its quantity, its description, the quality,
forage, and carrying capacity based upon animal units,
water, water rights, stock in irrigation companies, livestock
trails, crops, improvements, access, easements and crosseasements, impact of flood plain and zoning, regulations,
highest and best use, market value, market value based on
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forage and carrying capacity, leases, BLM permits, transfer
of BLM permits, commensurate land, the number and kind of
livestock operated by plaintiffs (or a corporation they
control), the value of that livestock, the economics of
plaintiffs' operation of the livestock business, the equities
involved in abolishing plaintiffs' livestock business, and
the equities of all the parties.
The Court having considered all the evidence,
arguments, and briefs submitted by the parties both at
earlier trial proceedings and at these final trial proceedings, and being fully advised in the premises, hereby
makes the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The parties are tenants in common of land

located in Salt Lake, Summit and Tooele Counties, State of
Utah, comprising a total of approximately 33,000 acres.
2.

Plaintiff Edward Leslie Gillmor (hereinafter

"plaintiff") owns an undivided one-fourth interest in all
the properties to be partitioned except the Whitehead
property, in which he owns an undivided one-half interest.
3.

Defendant Florence Gillmor owns an undivided

one-half interest in all the properties to be partitioned
except the Whitehead property, in which she has no interest.
4.

Defendant Charles F. Gillmor owns an undivided

one-fourth interest in all the subject properties except
the Whitehead property, in which he owns an undivided onehalf interest.
5.

The plaintiff has proposed a division of the

properties which would award him the following parcels
(hereinafter designated by the traditional names of each
property, which names were used by the parties and witnesses
throughout the trial):
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Salt Lake County

Acres

Salt Pond

590

West Grazing

1,968

Duck Club

1,050

Old Ranch Properties (including
§31 and property west of sewer

1,619

ditch)
Summit County
Six East

9,224

Tooele County
Rush Valley

6,600

I
TOTAL
6.

21,051

This proposal, if accepted, would result in

plaintiff receiving 63.8 percent of the land for his one' fourth interest in the property.

Plaintiff seeks to be

| awarded 100 percent of the Tooele property, 72.3 percent of
; the Salt Lake property, and 48.17 percent of the Summit
i

County property.
I

7.

The defendants have proposed a division of

| each of the various properties, with the exception of the
parcel known as the Old Ranch property, into parcels which
are equal in quantity and quality, thereby allowing each
party the opportunity to benefit from changes in the value
of each parcel as it changes from one type of use to another.
Fifteen of those parcels are more particularly identified
in defendants' three petitions for partition, dated June
22, 1976, November 12, 1976, and March 23, 1977, which
descriptions as amended are incorporated herein by reference.
The parties were permitted to state preferences between
parcels and defendants testified that each was willing to
abide the division, despite preferences.

If defendants'

!

proposal is accepted, plaintiff and defendant Charles F.

1

Gillmor would each be awarded one-fourth of the total

acreage of the subject property and Florence Gillmor would
receive one-half of the total, except as to the Whitehead
property in which Charles F. Gillmor and plaintiff would
each be awarded one-half.

Under defendants' proposal, each

co-owner would receive his pro rata share of all properties
of similar quality and in each physically separate location.
8.

In making its decision on partition the

Court gave full consideration to the preferences expressed
by all the parties during the trial and their reasons for
those preferences regarding each parcel of land.
9.

With the exception of the Whitehead property,

each of the owners of property in this action acquired his
or her interest through inheritance. Plaintiff and defendant
Charles F. Gillmor, Jr., inherited from their father,
Charles Frank Gillmor, Sr.

Defendant Florence Gillmor

inherited from her father, Edward Lincoln Gillmor.
10.

Historically, the land has been used by the

Gillmor family for a seasonal migratory livestock operation.
11.

Various members of the Gillmor family have

improved the properties by developing wells, water holes,
erecting fences, grading roads, building corrals, sheds and
cabins, developing a base ranch, and developing and cultivating land for agricultural use.
12.

Commencing in 1953, the plaintiff, in a

partnership with the defendant Charles F. Gillmor, operated
the livestock business by virtue of leases from Edward
Lincoln Gillmor.

In 1957, the plaintiff, defendant Charles

F. Gillmor, and Stephen T. Gillmor operated the livestock
business and this partnership leased the land owned by Edward
Lincoln Gillmor.

Following the retirement from the family

business of Charles Frank Gillmor, Jr., in 1968, plaintiff
and Stephen T. Gillmor leased land from Charles F. Gillmor,
Jr. and Edward Lincoln Gillmor.

After 1970, the plaintiff's

partnership with Stephen T. Gillmor ceased.
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13.

All the parties desire to utilize some

portions of the partitioned properties in future ranching
operations, whether they conduct such operations themselves
lor lease some of the properties to other ranchers.
14.

It is a common practice in this state for

ranchers to lease from others, including state and federal
governments, some or all of the properties on which they
conduct their livestock operations and to lease such properties
.to other ranchers.

Also, this has historically been the

practice for the subject properties.
15.

In early 1969 plaintiff and Stephen T.

Gillmor, who were then partners, entered into a lease with
I Edward Lincoln Gillmor of his one-half interest in the
properties. The agreed rent for the Tooele County property
was $0.15 per acre, for the Summit County property was
$0.50 per acre, and for the Salt Lake County property was
I$0.65 per acre.

Stephen T. Gillmor subsequently assigned

|his interest in the leases to plaintiff.

Those leases

(terminated December 31, 1978.
16.

In late 1969 plaintiff and Stephen T. Gillmor

also entered into leases with defendant Charles Frank
Gillmor, Jr., of his one-fourth interest in the properties,
for the same rent per acre as those in plaintiff's lease
with Edward Lincoln Gillmor.

Stephen T. Gillmor also

subsequently assigned his interest in those leases to
plaintiff.

Those leases will terminate this year (1980).

In 1969, when plaintiff entered the foregoing leases in
conjunction with his livestock partnership with Stephen
Gillmor, plaintiff did not lease his one-fourth interest in
the land to that partnership.
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17.

Plaintiff was able to utilize all the common

• Gillmor properties for his livestock business from 1969 to
! December 31, 1978 because of his leases with Florence Gillmor
and C. Frank Gillmor, Jr.
I

18.

Plaintiff paid substantially lower rates for

leasing the Gillmor common properties than the rates charged
1 by other grazing land lessors in this state in the late
' 1970's.
19.

Plaintiff testified that partitioning the

I subject properties in kind according to the proposal advanced
I by the defendants will force him out of the livestock
II business.

However, plaintiff has not leased or attempted

I to lease lands to replace the lands he formerly leased from
11 defendant Florence Gillmor's father or the lands which he
now has on lease from Charles F. Gillmor and which will
I soon expire.

Evidence was presented that such lease lands

i|

|l are available, and evidence was presented as to the cost
i'

thereof.
II
11

20.

Plaintiff also testified at trial that even

i
i

I if he were awarded partition in kind pursuant to his
II proposal, he would not be able to conduct a year-round
I livestock operation on the subject properties because he
II does not seek to be awarded any Summit County properties
other than Six East although he needs such properties for
I spring and fall grazing from late May to early July and
from early October through mid-November each year.
Accordingly, even if plaintiff is awarded all the properties
i he has requested, the acreage he would receive would not be
' sufficient to support a livestock operation of the size he
now owns (approximately 950 animal units) each spring and

l!
!' fall.

Similarly, he will be without sufficient forage for
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other seasons to the extent he does not seek the 700 North
and Sawmill properties, which he currently uses to capacity.
21.

Pursuant to an order made December 30, 1976,

the subject property except Whitehead was segregated into
separate blocks, with each of said blocks (except the Old
Ranch property) divided into parcels or sub-blocks of
equal acreage.

The blocks are denominated as follows:

Salt Lake County:
1.

Canning

2.

700 North

3.

Duck Club

4.

West Grazing

5.

Salt Pond

6.

Section 31

7.

West of sewage canal

8.

Old Ranch property
a.
b.
c.

Old ranch (corrals and buildings)
Irrigated farm
Sub-irrigated east of sewage canal

9.

Amos (2 blocks)

10.

1700 North

11.

2450 West

12.

Emigration Canyon (3 blocks)
Whitehead (owned by Charles F.
Gillmor and Edward Leslie Gillmor)

Summit County
13.

Seven East

14.

Six East

15.

Sawmill
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I
I

16.

Park City properties (5 blocks
(as shown below):
a.
b.
c.
d.

Todd Hollow (Porter lease)
Pace Meadow
90 Acres
Quarry

e.

Clark ranch

Tooele County
17.
22.

Rush Valley

In recent years the following properties

were used by plaintiff generally as follows:
Tooele County;
Rush Valley - winter range for sheep
Salt Lake County:
Salt Pond - spring range for sheep and
cattle; fall range for cattle.
Duck Club - spring range for sheep and
cattle; fall range for cattle.
700 North - spring for lambing of sheep
and calving of cows.

Thirty acres for hay

and grain.
1700 North - growing hay and residual
pasture.
Ranch property:
Section 31 - spring range for
sheep and cattle; fall range for
cattle.
West of canal - spring range
for sheep and cattle; fall range
for cattle.
Old Ranch - corrals, buildings,
headquarters of livestock operations
and farming.
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Improved - farming
Sub-Irrigated East of Canal hay.
Whitehead - spring range for
sheep and cattle; fall range for
cattle.
Summit County;
All Park City properties - spring and
fall ranges for sheep.
rams and some cattle.

Summer range for
Growing hay.

Six East - summer range for sheep and
cattle.
Sawmill - summer range for cattle.

23.

The following appraisers testified on behalf

of plaintiff as to the market value of some or all of the
subject properties:

Edward P. Westra, Richard M. Patterson

and Wilbur Harding.

The following appraisers testified on

behalf of defendants as to the market value of the properties:
Richard T. Huffman and Blaine D. Hales.
24.

Those appraisers presented the following

testimony as to the total value of the subject properties:
Appraiser:

Fair Market Value:

Westra

$43,615,150

Hale

$37,157,600

Huffman

$35,542,200

25.

The average net income of plaintiff's livestock

business for the years 1976, 1977, and 1978 amounted to
$12,497.53 per year, including oil lease income to plaintiff
of $104,000

received over two of those years.
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26.

The plaintiff's livestock business paid him

no salary in 1976, 1977, and 1978.

Had plaintiff's live-

stock corporation paid him a salary and had it been required
to pay current fair market value for the leases under which
plaintiff operated his business, that average net income
would have been considerably less than $12,497.53 each
year, even though he was employed full time in the ranching
operation.
27.

Plaintiff's livestock business netted him a

0.028 percent rate of return on the fair market value of
those properties (without including investment in livestock
and equipment) according to the testimony of his appraiser,
Mr. Westra; a 0.0336 percent rate of return on fair market ,
value according to defendants' appraiser, Mr. Hale; or a
0.035 percent rate of return on fair market value according
to defendants' expert, Mr. Huffman.
28.

A reasonable return on investment has not

been obtained by the plaintiff in the operation of his
livestock business.
29.

If plaintiff were awarded the land which he

has requested, he would receive an award having 16 percent
of the total market value of the property, according to the
appraisal rendered by Edward P. Westra.
63.8 percent of the land.

This would include

He would receive 26 percent of

the market value of the subject properties for his onefourth interest according to Blaine D. Hales.

He would

receive 26 percent of the market value of the subject
properties for his one-fourth interest according to Richard
T. Huffman.
30.

It is inequitable to award to plaintiff, as

the owner of a one-fourth interest in each parcel of land,
63.8 percent of the land.

It is equitable to partition

each parcel of land so that each owner is awarded part of
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each parcel in accordance with his interest therein, and so
that each owner will be able to benefit from varying increases
in the value of each parcel as their uses shift from present
use to higher and better use.
31.

Except for the Old Ranch, each of the remaining

blocks of land is dissimilar to other blocks in material
respects such as altitude, vegetation, present use and
potential use, water availability and development and
proximity to populated areas, but each such block is,
within itself, consistent throughout in such material
respects that each party can obtain his fair share of each
property, quality and quantity considered, if those properties
are so partitioned in kind that each party receives his pro
rata share of acreage in each block.
31.

With respect to each block of property, the

Court finds the following facts:

a.

Salt Lake County;
Canning
Acres: 160 more or less.
Division: Each 40 acres
more or less. Equal in
quantity and quality. Division into parcels will not
decrease value of the whole.
Can be partitioned without
prejudice to the owners.
Present Use: None
Highest and Best Use: Industrial
Improvements: 5600 West Street
and roads built by state
Stock trails: None
Water: A small well on parcel
3. Water users claim nos.
3695, 3774 and 3775.
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Access: Oil field road
from South Fork of Chalk Creek
and White's Basin, Perdue,
Neil and Spring Canyon, Lodgepole
routes described in "stock
trails," supra.
Sawmill
Acres: 5139 more or less
Division: Each 1284.75
acres more or less. Equal in
quantity and quality. Division
into parcels will not decrease
value of the whole. Can be
partitioned without great
prejudice to owners.
Present Use: Grazing
Highest and Best Use:
Grazing and recreational
Improvements: Fencing,
stock ponds, corrals
Stock Trails: Across Wright
property to get to grazing
land, Thirty Five Canyon.
See access.
Water: Developed springs
in Sections 21, 23, 26; spring
in Sawmill Canyon Section 33.
Access: On existing road
from 1-15 frontage road across
Wright property in mouth of
Sawmill Canyon.
Park City Properties
Todd Hollow - (Porter Lease)
Acres: 436 more or less
Division: Each 109
acres more or less.
Equal in quantity and
quality. Division into
parcels will not decrease
value of whole. Can be
partitioned without great
prejudice to owners.
Present Use: Grazing
(leased to third party)
Highest and Best Use:
Residential, recreational
Improvements: None
Stock Trails: None
Water: No filed claims.
Creek and spring, parcel 4.
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at a point approximately 800 feet west of
the north quarter corner of said Sec. 24,
thence along said road making a loop to the
left (north, thence west, thence south)
approximately 2900 feet to another point on
same section line of said Sec. 24 which
point is approximately 900 feet east of the
NW corner of said Sec. 24, thence along said
road south-westerly across the NW 1/4 NW 1/4
of said Sec. 24 to a point on the west
section line of said Sec. 24, which point is
approximately 700 feet south from NW corner
of said Sec. 24, thence along said road
westerly and northerly approximately 2300
feet to the north section line of Sec. 23 at
a point that is approximately 2300 feet west
of the NE corner of said Sec. 23, thence
along said road northwesterly approximately
4 500 feet to the west section line of Sec.
14, which point is approximately 2300 feet
south of the NW corner of Sec. 14, thence
along said road north-westerly approximately
3500 feet to the north section line of Sec.
15 which point is approximately 1700 feet
west of the NE corner of Sec. 15, thence
along said road northerly approximately 1
mile to the "oil well road" which point is
approximately 1100 feet west and 200 feet
south of the NE corner of Sec. 10, thence
following the center line of the Moil well
road" which runs northerly approximately 1
mile to a point approximately 100 feet south
and 900 feet west of the NE corner of Sec.
3, thence along said road around a loop to
the right (southwesterly, northwesterly and
northerly) approximately 2900 feet to the
north line of Sec. 3 at a point which is
approximately 2200 feet east of NW corner of
Sec. 3.
Also: 25 feet each side of a center line as
follows: Beginning at a point 25 feet west
of the east line of Sec. 3, T1S, R6E, SLB&M,
which point is approximately 1600 feet south
from north line of said Sec. 3, thence north
parallel to and 25 feet west of the east
section line of said Sec. 3 approximately
1000 feet to an existing road that is
approximately 600 feet south of the north
line of said Sec. 3.
51.

The block designated in defendants' petitions

as the Sawmill Property, described with particularity on
Exhibit 59-D, can be equitably partitioned in kind by dividing
it into four equal parcels of approximately 1284.28 acres
each, with east-west division lines. Designating the four
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I parcels numerically as they are shown on Exhibit 58-D
I(map 8-P), this property can be equitably partitioned
las follows:
Parcel 1:

I
I

The south 257 acres of the east
half of section 33 and the
south 513.75 acres of section
34 and the south 514.50 acres
of section 35, less .73 acre
reserved to State Road Commission, of T4N, R5E, SLB&M.
Contains 1284.50 acres.
Parcel 2:

I

I
I

J
|

Charles F. Gillmor

Edward L. Gillmor

The south 323.54 acres of
section 26, the south 323.54
acres of section 27, the south
323.54 acres of Section 28, the
north 63 acres of the east half
of section 33, the north 125.49
acres of section 34 and the
north 125.51 acres of section
35, T4N, R5E, SLB&M. Contains
1284.62 acres.
Parcel 3:

Florence Gillmor

The south 112.0 acres of section
21, the south 112.0 acres of
section 22, the south 111.0
acres of that portion of
section 23 owned by Gillmors,
the north 316.46 acres of
section 26, the north 316.46
acres of section 27, the north
316.54 acres of section 28 less
the northeast quarter of the
northeast quarter total net
276.46 acres, and the southeast
quarter of the northeast quarter
of section 30, T4N, R5E, SLB&M.
Contains 1284.58 acres.
Parcel 4:

Florence Gillmor

The north 528 acres of section
21, the north 528 acres of
section 22, the north 229 acres
of that portion of Section 23
owned by Gillmors, T4N, R5W,
SLB&M. Contains 1285 acres.
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Rights to water existing on each parcel should
accompany ownership of the surface.
Access is available to all parcels as follows:
Along existing road (part is only passable with four-wheel
drive) described as follows:
25 feet each side of a center line described as follows: Beginning at a point on
an existing road on the south section line
of Sec. 33, T4N, R5E, SLB&M which point is
approximately 450 feet west of the SE
corner of said Sec. 33, thence northerly
along the existing road approximately 1
mile to the north section line of said Sec.
33, thence northerly along an existing trail
near the creek bottom approximately 3500
feet to a junction of the canyon, thence
northeasterly following an existing trail
in the drainage of the right fork of Sawmill
Canyon approximately 3500 feet to a point
1000 feet north of the south section line
of Sec. 21, T4N, R5E, SLB&M.
52.

The block designated in defendants' petitions

as the Rush Valley Property, described with particularity on
Exhibit 64-D, can be equitably partitioned in kind by dividing
it into four parcels with boundary lines as indicated on
Exhibit 61-D.

This division will provide each party with his

or her proportionate share of the block.

Designating those

parcels numerically as shown on Exhibit 61-D (maps 7-P), this
property can be equitably partitioned as follows:
Parcel 1 (one tract):

Florence Gillmor

The west half of section 27, the west
half of section 34, the south half of
section 26, all of section 35, the west
35 acres of section 36 and the west 17.5
acres of the south half of section 25,
T5S, R5W, SLB&M. Contains 1652.5 acres.
Parcel 2 (three tracts):

Florence Gillmor

The east 302.5 acres of the south half
of section 25 and the east 605 acres of
section 36, T5S, R5W, and the west 105
acres of the northwest quarter of section
33 and all of section 36, T6S, R5W,
SLB&M. Contains 1652.5 acres.
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57.

The foregoing award to each of the parties of

the parcels of land and appurtenant rights which are subject
to this action is the most equitable method of partitioning
the subject properties.
58.

An Order should be entered denying all motions

made during the trial and not ruled upon by the Court.
59.

An Order should be entered admitting all

exhibits offered but not ruled upon by the Court during
trial.
60.

Defendant Florence Gillmor should be awarded

an Order of immediate occupancy of all properties and appurtenant rights awarded to her by virtue of the foregoing
Findings of Fact.
61.

Defendant Frank Gillmor should be awarded an

Order of occupancy to commence on January 1, 1981, when his
current leases with plaintiff have expired.
62.

Plaintiff Edward L. Gillmor should be awarded

an Order of immediate occupancy as to all properties and
appurtenant rights awarded to him by virtue of the foregoing
Findings of Fact.
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court
hereby enters its
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Having considered the mandates of §78-39-1

et. Beg., Utah Code Annotated

(1953), the Court finds it fair

and equitable that these properties should be partitioned in
kind as described in the foregoing Findings of Fact, as these
awards take into careful account possible prejudice to the
co-owners, the quality and quantity of the various properties,
divisibility of appurtenant rights, the preferences expressed
by the co-owners at the trial, the equities as respects
plaintiff's livestock operation on the one hand, as compared
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to the rights and desires of his co-tenants, on the other, the
value ascribed to the properties and plaintiff's return on that
investment.
2.

The parties are entitled to an award of partition

in kind of all the properties, except for the designated portion
in the Findings regarding the Old Ranch, which cannot be partitioned in kind without great prejudice to the owners and which
should therefore be sold.
3.

All the properties except the portions of the

Old Ranch designated to be sold should be partitioned in kind
among the various co-owners as set forth with particularity in
the foregoing Findings of Fact.
4.

The Old Ranch property should be sold in the

manner described in paragraph 36 of the foregoing Findings of
Fact.
5.

All motions made during the trial and not ruled

upon previously by the Court should be denied.
6.

All exhibits offered but not ruled upon by the

Court during trial should be received.
DATED this

day of December, 1980.

BY THE COURT:

PETER F. LEARY
DISTRICT JUDGE
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law was mailed,
postage prepaid, this /jr

day of December, 1980, to:

E. J. Skeen, Esq.
Skeen and Skeen
536 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Clifford L. Ashton, Esq.
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy
50 South Main, Suite 1600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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JAMES B. LEE
KATHLENE Tv. L0I7E
of and for
PARSONS, BEKLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Defendant
Florence Gillmor
79 South State Street
P.O. Box 11393
Salt Lake City, Utah 34147
Telephone:
(301) 532-1234
HAROLD G. CHRISTENSEN
H. JAMES CLEGG
of and for
SNOW, CHRISTENS EM & M?\RTINEAU
attorneys for Defendants Charles
F. Gillmor and Melba G. Gillmor
Continental Bank Building
Salt Lal:e Citv, Utah 34101
(801) 521-9000
Telephone:

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

*****
E^W^RD LESLIE GILLMOR and SIV
GILLMOR, his wife,
JUDGMENT AND DECREE
OF PARTITION

Plaintiffs,

Civil No. 223998

v.
FLORENCE GILLMOR, CHARLES F.
GILLMOR and MELDA G. GILLMOR,
his wife,
Defendants.

*****
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for
further trial proceedings following a remand from the
Supreme Court of the State of Utah, before the aboveentitled court sitting without a jury, Peter F. Leary,
Judge, presiding, commencing on the 11th day of February,
1930 and concluding on the 4th day of March, 1980.

All

parties were present and represented by counsel, plaintiffs
Edward Leslie Gillmor and Siv Gillmor being represented by

A ito\

EXHIBIT C

E. J. Skeen and Clifford L. Ashton, defendant Florence
Gillmor being represented by James B. Lee, and defendant
Charles F. Gillmor being represented by Harold C. Christensen
and H. Janes Clegg.
The Court having considered all the evidence,
arguments, and briefs submitted by the parties both at
earlier trial proceedings and at these final trial proceedings, and being fully advised in the premises, and
having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Lav;,
hereby makes and enters the following Order and Decree of
Partition:
1.

The mineral rights shall not be partitioned.

2.

The block designated as the Canning property

is hereby partitioned in kind by dividing it into four
ecual parcels of approximately forty acres each with northsouth division lines and awarded as follows:
Parcel 1:

Charles F. Gillmor

The Northwest quarter of the
Northeast quarter of Section 1,
T1S, R2W, SLB&M.
Parcel 2:

Florence Gillmor

The northeast quarter of the
Northwest quarter of Section 1,
T1S, R2W, SLB&M.
Parcel 3:

Florence Gillmor

The Northwest quarter of the
Northwest quarter of Section 1,
T1S, R2W, SLB&M.
Parcel 4:

Edward L. Gillmor

The Northeast quarter of the
Northeast quarter of Section 2,
T1S, R2U, SLB&M.
The water rights relating to the small well is
hereby awarded to the person who receives the land upon
which the well is located and that is as follows:

11555
-2-

road" which runs northerly approximately 1
mile to a point approximately 100 feet south
and 900 feet west of the NE corner of Sec.
3, thence along said road around a loop to
the right (southwesterly, northwesterly and
northerly) approximately 2900 feet to the
north line of Sec. 3 at a point which is
approximately 2200- feet east of NW corner of
Sec. 3.
Also: 25 feet each side of a center line as
follows: Beginning at a point 25 feet west
of the east line of Sec.
3, T1S, R6E, SLB&M,
which point is approximately 1600 feet south
from north line of said Sec. 3, thence north
parallel to and 25 feet west of the east
section line of said Sec. 3 approximately
1000 feet to an existing road that is
approximately 600 feet south of the north
line of said Sec. 3.
15.

The block designated as the Sawmill Property is

hereby partitioned in kind by dividing it into four equal
parcels with east-west division lines and awarded as follows:

P a r c e l 1:

C h a r l e s F . Gillre\or

The south 257 acres of the east
half of section 33 and the
south 513.75 acres of section
34 and the south 514.50 acres
of section 35, less .73 acre
reserved to State Road Commission, of T4N, R5E, SLB&M.
Contains 1284.50 acres.
Parcel 2:

Edward L. Gillmor

The south 323.54 acres of
section 26, the south 323.54
acres of section 27, the south
323.54 acres of Section 28, the
north 63 acres of the east half
of section 33, the north 125.49
acres of section 34 and the
north 125.51 acres of section
35, T4N, R5E, SLB&M. Contains
1284.62 acres.
Parcel 3:

Florence Gillmor

The south 112.0 acres of
section 21, the south 112.0
acres of section 22, the south
111.0 acres of that portion of
section 23 owned by Gillmors,
the north 316.46 acres of
section 26, the north 316.46

lir/s
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acres of section 27, the north
316.54 acres of section 28 less
the northeast quarter of the
northeast quarter total net
276.46 acres, and the southeast
quarter of the northeast quarter
of section 30, T4N, R5E, SLB&M.
Contains 1284.53 acres.
Parcel 4:

Florence Gillmor

The north 528 acres of section
21, the north 528 acres of
section 22, the north 229 acres
of that portion of Section 23
owned by Gillmors, T4N, R5N,
SLB&M. Contains 1285 acres.
Rights to water existing on each parcel are
hereby awarded to the owner of the surface.
A roadway and stock trail easement is reserved
as follows:
25 feet each side of a center line described as follows: Beginning at a point on
an existing road on the south section line
of Sec. 33, T4N, R5E, SLB&M which point is
approximately 450 feet west of the SE
corner of said Sec. 33, thence northerly
along the existing road approximately 1
mile to the north section line of said Sec.
33, thence northerly along an existing
trail near the creek bottom approximately
3500 feet to a junction of the canyon,
thence northeasterly following an existing
trail in the drainage of the right fork of
Sawmill Canyon approximately 3500 feet to a
point 1000 feet north of the south section
line of Sec. 21, T4N, R5E, SLB&M.
16.

The block designated as the Rush Valley Property

is hereby partitioned in kind by dividing it into four equal
parcels and awarded as follows:
Parcel 1 (one tract):

Florence Gillmor

The west half of section 27, the west
half of section 34, the south half of
section 26, all of section 35, the west
35 acres of section 36 and the west 17.5
acres of the south half of section 25,
T5S, R5W, SLB&M. Contains 1652.5 acres.

1979
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Properties shall be sold subject to easements and rights of
way of record or enforceable in law or equity.

A roadway and

stock trail easement is hereby reserved for the benefit of the
parties, their heirs and assigns as follows:
25 feet each side of a line described as
follows: Beginning at a point on an
existing road on the south section line of
Sec. 5, TIN, R1W, SLB&M, which point is
approximately 900 feet west of the SE
corner of said Sec. 5, thence following
said road northerly and westerly approximately 1500 feet to the point where said
existing road departs the property to be
sold and enters Parcel 4 of the block
described as "West of the Sewage Canal."
Water rights and claims to be included in the sale
are described as follows:

W.U.C. nos. 2714, 3345, 3346, 3347,

3473, 3430, 3431, 3432, 3479, 3341, 3342 and 3343.
22.

All motions made during the trial and not ruled

upon by the Court are denied.
23.

All exhibits offered but not ruled upon by the

Court during trial are admitted.
24.

Defendant Florence Gillnor is hereby awarded

immediate occupancy of all properties and appurtenant rights
awarded to her herein.
25.

Defendant Frank Gillmor is hereby awarded

occupancy effective January 1, 1931 of all properties and
appurtenant rights awarded to him herein.
26.

Plaintiff Edward L. Gillmor is hereby awarded

immediate occupancy as to all properties and appurtenant
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rights awarded to him herein.
Made and entered this s

/ d a y of P-Pfromhpr,

^^T
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STATE OF UTAH
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JAMES B. LEE
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Defendant
Florence J. Gillmor
79 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-1234
H. JAMES CLEGG
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendants
Charles F. Gillmor and
Melba G. Gillmor
700 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: 521-9000
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

EDWARD LESLIE GILLMOR and
SIV GILLMOR, his wife,
Plaintiffs

PROPOSED DIVISION OF
APPURTENANT RIGHTS

vs.
FLORENCE GILLMOR, CHARLES
F. GILLMOR and MELBA G.
GILLMOR, his wife,

Civil No. 223998

Defendants.

MINERAL RIGHTS
It has heretofore been stipulated and confirmed by
Order that oil, gas and mineral rights will not be partitioned
but will remain in undivided ownership.
WATER RIGHTS AND DITCH EASEMENTS
Defendants recommend that rights and claims to underground
and surface waters be awarded as appurtenances of the land
upon which such waters arise or are beneficially used.
Exceptions:
1.

Summit County.

Rights in surface waters arising

from Dorrity Spring and Silver Creek will be partitioned

F.YHTRTT T)

among the parties as follows:

Florence Gillmor 50%, Charles

Frank Gillmor 25%, and Edward Leslie Gillmcr 25%.

Since the

Gillmors collectively are entitled to four days of water use
out of each seven and one-half days, the water turns should
be as follows:

Florence Gillmor, 2 days; Charles Frank

Gillmor, 1 day; and Edward Leslie Gillmor, 1 day.

If the

"Ninety" and the "Pace Meadow" are divided as proposed by
defendants, each party's water right may be appurtenant to
his or her partitioned real property.

Ditch easements for

conveyance of water to the parcels should be granted in
existing ditches as follows:
(a) Northeast through the center of the "Ninety";
(b)

Northerly on the east side of and parallel to

the Union Pacific Railroad track through the Pace Meadow;
(c)

Northerly parallel to and about 900 feet west

of the said railroad track to the terminus of existing
ditch at about the center of the west half of Section
26, T1S, R4E, again serving the Pace Meadow.
2.

Salt Lake County.
(a)

An easement for the so-called "Sheep Ditch",

diverted from the North Point Canal about one quarter
mile east of the southwest corner of Section 15, TIN, R2W,
SLB&M and running in a northwesterly direction through
the SW 1/4 of Sec. 15, NE 1/4 of Sec. 16, S 1/2 of Sec.
9, thence westerly into SE 1/4 of Sec. 8, all TIN/ R2W.
Ownership of this easement and division of the water
shares in the North Point Canal Company should be
awarded to those who acquire the benefited properties
in the West Grazing Area.
(b)

Award of remaining North Point Canal Company

shares as benefit the irrigated property in the NW 1/4
of Sec. 25, TIN, R1W, SLB&M.
necessary to convey the water.

No ditch easement is

3.

Tooele County.

Of the Gillmor water right from

Ophir Creek, Florence Gillmor will be awarded one-half and
each of the other parties will be awarded one-quarter, each
having a right to remove stock water for hauling.
ROADS AND TRAILS
Vehicle rights-of-way shall be two rods in width along
existing roads, unless otherwise noted.

Livestock trails

shall be along such roads but shall include an additional
rod on each side of 'the road, unless an owner chooses to
fence, in which case he may fence along the vehicle rightof-way.
Salt Lake County
(a)

Canning Property:

A new road consisting of

the two southernmost rods commencing at 5600 West,
easterly to the east end of the property.
(b)

7th North Property:

Seventh North (a county

road) will serve all of the "7th North Property".
(c)

Duck Club Property:

This property shall be

served by the Duck Club Road which commences 1/4 mile
west of the SE corner of Sec. 27, TIN, R2W, and runs
thence northerly through said section, and continues
northerly through Section 22 to a point approximately
1/4 mile west of the NE corner of said Section 22,
thence northeasterly through Section 15 to a point 1/4
south of the NE corner of said Section 15, where the
Duck Club Road leaves the Duck Club Property.
Also, this property shall be served in part by the
Island Road which originates from the Duck Club Road at
the point where the Duck Club Road crosses the north
boundary line of Sec. 22.

The Island road then courses

in a Northwesterly direction traversing a portion of
the SE 1/4 of said Sec.

15, through the SW 1/4 of said
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Sec. 15, and leaves the Duck Club Property at a point
approximately 300' south and 1320* east of the western
boundary line of Sec. 15.
(d)

West Lambing Range:

This property shall be

served by the Island Road which first enters the property
at a point approximately 2000' south of the NE corner
of Sec. 16, TIN, R2W, thence northwesterly to a point
approximately 200' south of the N 1/4 corner of Sec.
16, thence westerly through said section, traversing
westerly through the northernmost portions of Sections
17, 18, to the western boundary of Sec. 13 in the Salt
Pond Area.
This property shall also be served by an unimproved
jeep road which commences at a point on the Island Road
which is located near the N 1/4 corner of Section 16,
running thence northerly through Section 9, to a point
near the S 1/4 corner of Section 4, thence northeasterly
through the southeast 1/4 of Section 4, to a point near
the east 1/4 corner of Sec. 4, where said road leaves
the subject property.
(e)

Salt Pond Area:

This area is served by a

continuation of the Island Road which commences at a
point approximately 200' south of the NE corner of Sec.
13, TIN, R3W, and traverses westerly across the northernmost
portion of the NE 1/4 of said Sec. 13.

A new road northerly

along the east boundary of the Gillmor property will serve
tracts north of the Island Road.
(f)

Section 31;

This property shall be served by

an existing road which enters the Ranch property at a
point approximately 800' west from the south corner of
Sec. 5, TIN, R1W and runs northwesterly to a point
approximately 2000' north and 2000' west from the SE
corner of said Sec. 5, where the road leaves the Ranch
property and traverses westerly through the SW 1/4 of

-4-

Sec. 5, thence northwesterly through the north 1/2 of
Sec. 6, TIN, RIW, to a point approximately 1320' east
of the SW corner of Sec. 31, T2N, RIW.

Said road then

runs northerly through the full length of Sec. 31 to
the northern boundary thereof.
(g)

Ranch Property:

This property is served by a

road, previously described in (f) above, which traverses
the SE 1/4 of Section 5, TIN, RIW, in a northwesterly
direction.

It is also served by a second road which

begins at a point on the previously described road,
which point is located approximately 2000 * west and
2000* north of the SE corner of Sec. 5, and which
thence traverses northerly through the NW 1/4 of Sec.
5, on through the SW 1/4 of Sec. 32, T2N, RIW.
(h)

East Amos Property:

This property shall be

served by an existing county road commonly known as
"Rose Park Lane" which commences at the intersection of
17th North and runs northerly along the eastern section
line of Sec. 21, TIN, RIW, through the East Amos Property.
(i)

West Amos Property:

This property is served

by an existing county road commonly known as 24 50 West
which abuts the western boundary line of this property.
(j)

38 Acres Near Airport:

This property is also

served by an existing county road commonly known as
2450 West which abuts the western boundary line of said
property.
(k)

Pine Crest Property:

This property shall be

served by an existing road which enters the property at
a point approximately 1320' south of the NE corner of
Sec. 28 TIN, R2E, running thence southwesterly through
the S 1/2 of the NE 1/4 of Sec. 28 to the quarter line
of said section where this road terminates.
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This

property shall also be served by a new road which
commences at the beginning of the existing road and
runs southwesterly to a point on Brigham Fork near the
south 1/4 corner of said Section 28.

Also, a new road

which begins on the E-W 1/4 line of said Sec.

28 where

the existing road terminates, and runs along 6050'
contour line in a westerly direction into the NW 1/4 of
said Sec. 2 8 where it terminates.
Summit County
(a)

Todd Hollow:

Use U.S. 40.

(b)

Clark Ranch:

An existing road entering the

Gillmor property at the NE corner of SE 1/4 SE 1/4 Sec.
2, T2S, R4E, thence southerly to junction in NE 1/4
NE 1/4 Sec. 11.

Branches (1) west across N 1/2 N 1/2

Sec. 11 and (2) southerly to leave the Gillmor property
at about one quarter mile west of the SE corner of 11,
T2S, R4E; also existing connection road from about oneeighth mile south of NE corner NE 1/4 NE 1/4 and running
southwesterly to connect about three-eighths of a mile
north of the center of Section 11.

Also, a new road

commencing at aforementioned junction and running
southeasterly to the NE corner of the SW 1/4 NW 1/4 of
Sec. 12 and continuing southeasterly across Gillmor
property.
(c)

Ninety:

Served by U.S. 40A (S.R.248) and by

old U.S. 40A, now re-routed.
(d)

Quarry Property:

No easements necessary.
Cross easements not necessary,

all proposed parcels having access to public roads.
(e)

Pace Meadow:

Access by existing county road

parallel to and east of Union Pacific Railroad track.
Also, existing haul road parallel to and west of Silver
Creek.
(f)

Sixth East:

No cross easements necessary.

(g)

Seventh East:

Access to Gillmor property by

existing South Fork Chalk Creek Road.

New roads to be

surveyed where required to provide access to each
owner.
(h)

Saw Mill Canyon:

Existing road up Sawmill

Canyon, northerly through center of E 1/2 Sec. 33,
T4N, R5E, thence northeasterly through NW 1/4 NW 1/4,
Sec. 27, S 1/2 Sec. 22, thence southeasterly through
SW 1/4 Sec. 23 and southerly through E 1/2 Sec. 26,
all T4N, R5E.
(i) Tooele County:

Existing roads with respect

to property south of Deseret Chemical (South Tooele
Army Depot), as needed to reach individual allotments.
Respectfully submitted this 18th day of May, 1977
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER

By U/l/^f 4 ? X^Ll—

James B. Lee
A t t o r n e y s for Defendant
F l o r e n c e J . Gillmor

SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

By

'/

. ( < ^ ^Y ~~~^~

H. James C l e g g < ?
Attorneys for Defendants
Charles F. Gillmor and
Melba G. Gillmor
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JAMES

B. LEE

of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Defendant
Florence Gillmor
79 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
Telephone: 532-1234
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

EDWARD LESLIE GILLMOR and
SIV GILLMOR, his wife,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
FLORENCE GILLMOR, CHARLES
F. GILMOR and MELBA G.
GILLMOR, his wife,

PETITION RELATING
TO PROCEDURE TO BE
FOLLOWED IN PARTITIONING LAND
Civil No. 223998

Defendants.

Defendants, by and through their attorneys, James B.
Lee of Parsons, Behle & Latimer and H. James Clegg of
Worsley, Snow & Christensen, representing ownership of three
quarters of the property to be partitioned, request the
Court to reject the Referees' Report and adopt the procedure
described below with respect to partitioning the land in
question.
Defendants petition the Court to segregate the land
into fifteen separate blocs, each to be divided into four
equal parcels.

They further petition the Court to designate

which of those parcels should be distributed to each of the
property owners in accordance with their property interest,
cross easements to be awarded all parties to provide traditional means of access to each tract.
The fifteen separate blocs would be as follows:

EXHIBIT E

1.

Canning Property;

Division -- Divide into four 40 acre tracts in accordance with the cadastral survey.
2.

700 North Property

Contains property in Sections 25, 26 and 27 (E 1/4),
T. 1 N., R. 2 W.
Division —

Divide into four tracts of equal acreage,

each having frontage on 7th North Street.

(Old Saltair

Highway).
3.

Duck Club Area:

Property in Sections 11, 14, 15, 22 (N 1/2) and 23
T . 1 N . , R. 2 W.
Division -- Divide into four parcels of equal acreage
in such way that each of the parcels will have marsh frontage for recreational (duck hunting) use and the division
lines run east-west.
4.

West Grazing Area:

Contains property in Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 16 and
18 T. 1 N., R. 2 W. and that portion of Section 3, T. I N . ,
R. 3 W. south of the Goggin Drain.

The property in which

the Gillmors own an undivided 1/2 interest and Irvine owns
the other 1/2 interest would not be included.

An effort

should be made to sell the Gillmors' interest to Irvine or
to Duck Club members.
Division -- Divide the area into four separate parcels
of equal acreage.
5.

Salt Pond Area:

Includes lake front property in Sections 1, 12 and 13
(north of Goggin Drain), T. 1 N., R. 3 W.
Division —

Divide into four parcels of equal acreage

so that each parcel will have lake frontage, division lines
to run east-west.
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6.

Ranch Property:

Division -(a)

Divide Section 31 into four parcels of equal

acreage, with division lines running north-south.
(b)

Divide the balance of the property into four

parcels as follows:
(1)

The old ranch including buildings and
improvements.

(2)

The improved and irrigated ground on the
south side of the property contiguous to
the Jordan River and west parcel watered
by pump.

(3)

Balance of the property east from the
sewage canal.

(4)

Balance of the property west of sewers.

7.

17th North - Rose Park Property:

Division, -- Divide into four parcels with equal footage
along 1700 North Street as extended eastward across Redwood
Road.
8.

Amos Property:

Division -- Divide property into four parcels of equal
acreage? East-West from Rose Park Lane.
9.

2450 West Property:

Division -- Divide into four parcels of equal size, all
fronting upon 2450 West Street.
10.

Emigration Canyon:

Division -(a)

The lower property will be deemed 1/4 of the total.

(b)

The Little Mountain property will be deemed 1/4 of

the total.
(c)

The Pine Crest property to be divided into two

parcels of equal acreage which shall be assigned 1/4 each.
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11.

Park City Properties:

Division -(a)

All water rights flowing from land on which it

arises including Silver Creek, Dority Springs and United
Park water to be divided 1/4 to Edward Gillmor, 1/4 to
Charles Gillmor, and 1/2 to Florence Gillmor.
(b)

Clark Ranch plus 90 acres immediately south from

the railroad to be allocated 1/2 and to be awarded to Florence
Gillmor.
(c)

Quarry property plus Porter lease (Todd Hollow)

property to be designated as 1/4.
(d)
12.

The Pace Meadow property to be designated 1/4.
7 E - Chalk Creek Property:

Division -- Divide into four parcels of equal acreage.
13.

6 E Property:

Division -(a)

Use Elk Horn Ridge as a dividing line cutting the

property roughly in half.
(b)

Divide north half a north parcel and a south parcel

of equal acreage.
(c)

Divide the south half into an east parcel and a

west parcel of equal acreage.
Each of the parcels will be designated 1/4.
14.

Saw Mill Property:

Division -- Divide the property into four parcels of
equal acreage with division lines running from east to west.
15.

Rush Valley:

Division -(a)

Determine total acreage and divide into four par-

cels of equal acreage —

to the extent feasible, property

within each parcel to be contiguous.
(b)

Divide the A.U.M.s equally into four parts.
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If the Court accepts this procedure, the defendants
propose that maps be prepared by Sumner Margetts Company
illustrating fifteen separate blocs and dividing said blocs
into portions as above set forth.
Defendants submit that this procedure would be in accordance with the Partition Statute (Chapter 39 of Title 78,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended).

Further, defendants

believe that this procedure would be the most efficient and
economical one that could be followed by the Court and,
more importantly, the most equitable.
DATED this /

- '• 'day of June, 1976.

'dA*Uj fa 7 u X
JAMES B. LEE
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Defendant
Florence Gillmor

jf. VJAM£# CLEGG
of-and for
WORSLEY, SNOW & CHRISTENSEN
Attorneys for Defendants
Charles F. Gillmor and
Melba G. Gillmor

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing
Petition Relating to Procedure to be Followed in Partitioning
Land to Mr. H. James Clegg, Worsley, Snow & Christensen, Attorneys for Defendants Charles F. Gillmor and Melba G. Gillmor,
Seventh Floor, Continental Bank Building, Salt Lake City,
Utah, 84101, and to R. C. Skeen, Skeen & Skeen, Attorneys for
Plaintiffs, 536 East Fourth South, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84102,
tnis
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JAMES B. LEE
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Defendant
Florence J. Gillmor
79 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-1234
H. JAMES CLEGG
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendants
Charles F. Gillmor and
Melba G. Gillmor
700 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: 5 21-9000
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH

EDWARD LESLIE GILLMOR and
SIV GILLMOR, his wife,
Plaintiffs,
MOTION
vs.
Civil No. 223998
FLORENCE GILLMOR, CHARLES
F. GILLMOR and MELBA G.
GILLMOR, his wife,
Defendants

Defendants move the Court to view the easements
as items of continuing jurisdiction.

It is anticipated

that the number of necessary roads will decrease as
properties are awarded because Florence Gillmor will
acquire in some instances both dominant and servient
tracts, making declaration of easement unnecessary.
Further, defendants move that easements be awarded
on a dominant-servient basis and only to a party
needing such easement.

Party A may need an easement

across Party B's tract to reach his own.

Absent other

compelling reason, there is no need to award Party C
an easement if his property lies in another direction

EXHIBIT F

and is served by a different access.
With respect to location of new roads, the recommendations of a surveyor may be essential and it may
be necessary to amend or modify the Decree as information
becomes available to do equity between and among the
parties.
Respectfully submitted this 18th day of May, 1977.
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER

smut BJ*Zs $_

s B. Lee
torneys for Defendant
lorence J. Gillmor

SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
7
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H. Jame^Clegg 'S
Attorneys for Defendants
Charles F. Gillmor and
Melba G. Gillmor
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that I served copies of the foregoing Motion
and copies of Proposed Division of Appurtenant Rights
upon Messrs. Rex J. Hanson and E. J. Skeen this 18th
day of May, 1977.

H. James Clegg

